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ABSTRACT
Mixed property regimes are on the rise in the United States and
in many other countries throughout the world. Yet this fast-growing
phenomenon currently lacks a broad-scale scholarly analysis aimed at
extracting the shared theoretical principles of these intriguing property configurations. This Article offers an innovative analysis of the
various types of mixed property regimes located along the sides of the
private-common-public property triangle and within it. This Article
re-conceptualizes the property formations of Public-Private Partnerships and Common Interest Communities, and identifies and analyzes phenomena such as the Israeli Renewing Kibbutz, various forms
of public-common property mixtures (e.g., the management and
maintenance of city-owned parks in New York City), and tri-layered
regimes such as Community Land Trusts. In so doing, this Article offers a first of its kind, comprehensive taxonomy of mixed property
regimes.
Although these different property patterns vary greatly in the
way they create, allocate, and enforce entitlements and responsibilities among the relevant parties, this Article identifies a consolidated
theoretical basis for mixed property regimes, pointing as well to the
normative advantages that these hybrid forms may have over purer
property regimes, thus significantly enriching the property landscape.
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INTRODUCTION
The world of property regimes is currently in the midst of a vivid
debate involving constant attempts to challenge and reconfigure traditional property patterns. One reason for this is normative. While
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private property has been hailed as generally superior by many in
Western legal and economic academia throughout large parts of the
modern era, recent analysis points to the potential drawbacks of a
massive transition toward privatization of publicly-owned resources, as
well as to the inefficiencies of over-fragmentation of rights resulting
from having “too much” private property. Moreover, the renewed in1
terest in common property regimes, which has revealed the potential
economic and social advantages of group ownership and management of resources, further adds to the creation of a more balanced
contest between the three vertices of the private-common-public
2
property triangle.
Another driving force for this property turmoil has been analytical, stemming from the observation that the nature of property depends not only on formal ownership, but also on the specific composition of the property “bundle,” especially in the context of
externalities and other types of conflicts over specific use rights in the
resource. This entitlements literature demonstrates that a single
property regime may take numerous sub-forms depending on the
type of strategy chosen for delineating rights in the different attributes of the resource at stake. For example, authors have fixed the
spectrum of private property demarcation between the “exclusion”
and “governance” poles, the former delegating to the formal owner
control over a large and indefinite class of uses and attributes, and
the latter dispersing decision-making about the resource through ex3
tensive public or group governance regimes. Hence, the nature of
1

By the term “common property,” I refer to what is also termed “limited common property,” namely an asset which is shared by members of a given group, but is
exclusive property with respect to outsiders. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of
Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV.
129, 139 (1998). This distinguishes common property from an “open access” resource, in which everyone has a privilege of use, but correspondingly no one has a
right to exclude others. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 23 (1990).
2
Although one also needs to consider the option of open-access resources, both
theoretically and practically (for example, as with literary works following the termination of the designated copyright protection period), so that the property landscape could be portrayed instead as constituting a tetrahedron, I focus in this Article
on private, common, and public property regimes, and hence I resort to the image of
a triangle.
3
See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 453–57 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Two Strategies]. Michael Heller locates the governance axis between private despotic dominion
on one end and public authority and control on the other, with intermediate forms
of “property governance” in between. Michael Heller, Common Interest Developments at
the Crossroads of Legal Theory, 37 URB. LAW. 329, 331–32 (2005) [hereinafter Heller,
Common].
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the property regime is prescribed not only by the formal rights allocation (chiefly the designation of “ownership”), but also by the question
of who is assigned the power to make decisions about the different
attributes and components of the resource.
This Article argues that such a careful and contextual analysis of
property should also create increasing awareness and normative support for explicit mixed types of property regimes, whenever these may
prove optimal to obtain society’s goals. Looking at the privatecommon-public property triangle, one can observe a real-life proliferation of property configurations that are located at interim points
along the sides of the triangle and within it, thus largely departing
from the traditional trichotomic division which has focused on the
three vertices of property. Although a few mixed property regimes
have existed historically, contemporary market and public needs and
preferences seem to push more than ever before toward the constant
creation of new property mixtures. However, this rapidly-growing
phenomenon currently lacks a comprehensive, broad-scale analysis of
mixed property regimes, aimed at extracting shared theoretical principles. This is exactly what this Article sets out to do.
Whereas certain property configurations along the public-private
and the private-common sides of the property triangle have been
studied separately (such as Public-Private Partnerships or Common
Interest Communities), the very existence of the third side, that of
the public-common, has been largely ignored. This Article sheds
light on this unilluminated side of the triangle by identifying and
analyzing various types of what I term “public commons” and by
combining this innovative analysis within the broader framework of
mixed property regimes.
Moreover, aiming at a fuller exploration of the property triangle
(although one obviously cannot completely cover it, let alone within
the scope of a single research project), this Article also looks at the
intriguing phenomenon of tri-layered property regimes located at the
heart of the triangle, namely, those unique property configurations
which explicitly aim at providing a more-or-less equal balance between private, common, and public interests in structuring the ownership and management scheme for a certain resource.
Although the different mixed property regimes vary greatly in
the way they create, allocate, and enforce entitlements and responsibilities among the relevant parties, they do share some theoretical
features that may also point to the normative advantages that these
hybrid forms may have over traditional, purer property regimes. In
some cases, however, current doctrines that govern these property
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mixtures are unsatisfactory—which is unsurprising given that many of
these doctrines were established based on the trichotomic paradigm—and must therefore be amended in order to allow for mixed
property regimes to fully flourish and to considerably enrich the
property landscape.
At the outset, I find it important to make the following points
regarding the scope, methodology, and ambition of this Article.
First, this Article’s point of departure in discussing the triangle’s
vertices (i.e., “pure” property regimes) largely adheres to the conven4
tional typology of private, common, and public property.
This
means that I identify a certain property regime as pure or nearly pure
when both the formal rights allocation and the decisionmaking capacities generally point in the same direction. Obviously, in very few
instances, if any, one can expect a perfect match between these two
realms, or even a strict “purity” in one of them. Indeed, it would be
safe to say that basically all real-life resources exhibit some kind of
5
property mixture. And yet, for a significant number of resources,
one can identify substantial prominence for one type of regime, such
that it can be located in relative proximity to one of property’s vertices. I thus believe that although the conventional typology is unsatisfactory in that it misses out on much of the property landscape, it is
neither a theoretically empty concept nor a practically empty group.
Second, as stated, the mixed property forms discussed in this Article do not purport to be an exhaustive list or anything close to it.
The examples put forward represent intriguing examples of the evolution and formation of certain types of mixed property regimes.
This is done with the hope that the conceptualization and initial
analysis in this Article will be of aid in illuminating and understanding other property mixtures that are not overtly discussed here.
Third, this project is not driven by a single normative agenda
(such as promotion of efficiency, liberty, or equity), nor does it aim at
providing a unified key for choosing between different types of pure
or mixed property regimes. The Article does construct, however, a
4

See DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP
INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 8–14 (2002) (offering a critical discussion of this typology).
5
In the context of land, all privately-owned lands in modern life, even those not
located in dense urban areas, are subject to significant government regulation and
other types of external control. See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership in Regulatory Taking Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227,
251–53 (2004). Similarly, public lands almost inherently implicate private rights and
interests. See Jim Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 241 (1994).
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theoretical framework for the concept of property mixtures and explicates ways in which certain values and goals—as chosen by society’s
institutions—can be promoted, or perhaps inhibited, by different
concoctions of property forms. This Article’s primary purpose is thus
to identify, analyze, and illuminate the theoretical and policy implications of the larger spectrum of institutional property choices. In so
doing, it offers some initial tools for normatively evaluating the possible pros and cons of a societal recognition in certain innovative types
of property regimes, not only in the sense of enforcing it among the
directly involved parties, but also by validating the proprietary characteristics of these regimes vis-à-vis government, third parties and the
6
public at large.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines the contemporary partial disillusionment with the ability of private property to
serve as a panacea for the universe of resources, and studies the increasing number of arguments made in favor of the common property and public property options. It then explains why the choice
does not have to be narrowed down to these three alternatives by
briefly revealing the past experience and present potential of mixed
property regimes.
The following parts study these latter types of alternatives in detail. Part II looks at the public-private continuum, focusing attention
on the current forms of Public-Private Partnerships and on the
greater role that the law needs to play to arrive at a proper balance
between the private and public interests in such collaborative
schemes.
Part III examines private-common property, looking at two fascinating different configurations of this mixture. It first examines
Common Interest Communities, which have become a systematic
choice of homebuyers throughout the U.S., and re-conceptualizes
these institutions based on the contract-based theory of property as
the residual claim to the resource’s attributes. It then looks at the
dramatic changes that the Israeli Kibbutz—once the paradigm of
pure common property—went through in the past few years by shifting to an interim property model that combines incentives for private
productivity alongside the maintenance of a newly-defined core ideology of solidarity and social justice.
Part IV identifies the “public commons” by focusing on the case
study of New York City’s publicly-owned spaces. These resources, and
6

See Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J (forthcoming 2008) (discussing the characteristics of the institution of property as combining in rem and in personam traits).
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especially the city’s nearly 1800 parks, have become the subject of
numerous models of systematic local community involvement, both
formal and informal, in the maintenance, stewardship, and improvement of these resources, thus locating many of these spaces in
an intriguing balance between the interests of the general public and
those of the geographically-adjacent local groups of users.
Part V studies tri-layered regimes by looking at the growing phenomenon of Community Land Trusts, an innovative mechanism for
the creation of long-lasting affordable housing through a unique
formal structure that tries to draw the fine line between the interests
of the affordable housing dwellers, as individuals and as a group, and
those of the larger community.
Part VI delineates the initial contours of a theory of mixed property regimes. It demonstrates the need for mixed property regimes
when utilitarian and non-utilitarian considerations do not conform to
pure or nearly-pure property regimes. It also explains the greater
flexibility that mixed property regimes possess both in engaging in
innovative trial-and-error schemes and in confronting the everlasting
challenge of dividing the law, and property law in particular, into distinct categories in a manner that ensures a sufficient level of stability
and certainty but that at the same time maintains normative and
practical integrity.
I.

THE MARKET FOR MIXED PROPERTY REGIMES

A. The Limits of Private Property
In what is by now a true property classic, Harold Demsetz’s Toward a Theory of Property Rights offers an evolutionary analysis (accompanied by vigorous normative support) of human society’s shift to
private property as the pressure on resources increases and technological or organizational innovations enable cost-effective delineation
7
and protection of private property. According to Demsetz’s normative analysis, private property creates incentives for socially desirable
investment in resources by making the owner internalize both the
positive and negative effects of his actions, thus unifying the private
8
cost-benefit analysis with the respective social calculus. Even if cer7

Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(1967) [hereinafter Demsetz, Theory I].
8
Id. at 347–50. The origins of this analysis go back to thinkers such as Adam
Smith, William Blackstone, and Jeremy Bentham. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360–64
(2001).
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tain human actions still defy the borders of private property, the better feasibility of a relatively small number of neighboring owners to
resolve such residual externalities adds to the superiority of private
9
property over “communal property,” let alone over state ownership.
The argument for private property has not relied merely on
economic instrumentality. Significantly, it has been advanced in
10
Western thought as a promoter of individual liberty, political free11
12
13
dom, personhood constitution, the intrinsic virtue of labor, and
14
so forth. The fall of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s has allegedly
made this multi-faceted argument for private property supremacy an
15
open-and-shut case.
However, recent years have seen the development of more modified approaches, which often criticize the tendency toward sweeping
privatization of the universe of resources. Three lines of argument
are of particular interest here, as they also point to the viability of
other property regimes, including hybrids.
First, the decision whether to shift to private property is often not
motivated by benign entrepreneurship seeking to snatch resource
productivity from the jaws of collective action tragedies, but rather by
rent-capturing facilitated through superiority in the political process.
For example, the enclosure movement’s abolition of traditional
communal property forms in Europe and in its colonies was designed
in large part, with its distributional outcomes in mind, by employing
9

Demsetz, Theory I, supra note 7, at 354−59. Other authors have discussed later
developments of the evolutional theory of private property rights based on Demsetz’s
basic insights. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property
Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 118 (T.L. Anderson &
F.S. McChesney eds., 2003); Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property
Rights and the Optimal Value of an Asset, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2002).
10
See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS THE GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY 59
(1993); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 279−81 (1999); LAURA UNDERKUFFLER,
THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 40 (2003).
11
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7−21 (1962).
12
See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 36−59 (1993).
13
See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 254−56, 285−87 (1990).
14
This is obviously not to say that such non-instrumental values are uncontested.
See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1907–38 (2005)
(critiquing the liberty argument as promoting the ideal of property as facilitating an
exit from society); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 329 (1996) (offering a critique of the various justifications for elevating private
property to the status of the key right).
15
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition Between
Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 653, 653 (2002) [hereinafter Demsetz, Theory II] (arguing that the shift to capitalist-style economies in Eastern Europe,
Russia, and China has brought private property to a previously unattained level of
importance in the world).

LEHAVI_FINAL

2008]

1/11/2008 1:59:14 PM

MIXING PROPERTY

145

allegedly neutral property reorganization techniques aimed at bene16
fiting the rich or politically powerful. Similarly, the propertization
of information resources of the West, while instilling open access to
information resources that are prevalent in other parts of the world,
such as genetic resources and traditional knowledge, has been criticized as a political and distributional enterprise not necessarily loyal
17
to either efficiency or justice.
Conversely, the delay in development of individual transferable
quotas in U.S. federal coastal fisheries may be explained by the multiple veto points that are provided by political institutions and exploited by interest groups to slow the pace of change, chiefly because
of distributive disputes about the initial allocation of the tradable
18
rights. These criticisms point to the conclusion that in fact neither
a change to private property from open-access, common, or public
property regimes necessarily promotes society’s declared goals, nor
does a rejection of privatization of certain resources necessarily indi19
cate that such a regime is inferior under the relevant circumstances.
Second, private property may often lead to a scenario of overfragmentation of rights, in which every one of the multiple owners
has a right to exclude others from a resource such that no one has an
20
effective privilege of use. This anticommons dynamics may, inter
alia, deter socially desirable innovation (such as when granting patents in isolated gene fragments hampers development of integrative
21
biomedical products), or otherwise prevent the pooling together of

16

Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 359,
365−70 (2002). I do not argue that the enclosure movement had no utilitarian merits. I only wish to remark in this context that the true motives for this phenomenon,
and the specific ways in which it was designed, were largely influenced by other implicit but significant types of considerations.
17
Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 1331, 1339−57 (2004).
18
Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private
Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 224−26 (2005).
19
In many developing countries, rising resource values do not necessarily result
in the creation of private property rights, but rather in an inefficient regime of open
access. This is because the polynormative and multilayered structure of these societies does not enable state agencies to effectively enforce formal property rights
against local groups, while at the same time the reliance of these communities on informal norms and self-enforcement is insufficient to exclude outsiders. Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1001 (2006).
20
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 667−79 (1998).
21
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovations? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Cynthia D. Lopez-Beverage,
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resources for efficient reorganization (for example, when landowners
in a rundown urban area fail to agree on a comprehensive redevel22
opment scheme).
In some cases, the private property bundle can be arranged to
mitigate such grave consequences of sub-optimality. For example,
the common law of nuisance, which requires the plaintiff to meet a
certain threshold of interference, and at times limits his rights to a
liability rule protection (court-determined damages) thus allowing
the defendant’s conflicting activity to continue, can be explained by
the desire to prevent paralysis in a world of substantial transaction
23
costs. This is especially so when the benefits of a certain action that
physically exceeds property borders far outweighs the damage to the
affected property owner, such that a use-specific switch to a “governance” regime at the expense of the “exclusion” default of private
24
property avoids severe deadweight losses.
Beyond such reshaping of private property, the anticommons dilemma may point to the potential advantages of other property regimes. For example, general circulation and commerce routes have
been historically supplied publicly (as is still generally the case today),
given the high transaction costs of organizing a private system of
25
easements, as well as the positive synergy or network effect of open26
ing such routes to use by the general public. The advantages of the
publicness of such conduits, which allows for the development of private activity channeling through them, has prompted calls to extend
public ownership or governance to new domains, such as cyber27
space. Moreover, the ability of property governance to promote socially beneficial collective action inspired an academic renaissance of
common property regimes, with authors pointing, inter alia, to the
28
advantages of economies of scale and risk-spreading, enhanced selfShould Congress Do Something about Upstream Clogging Caused by the Deficient Utility of Expressed Sequence Tag Patents?, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 35, 78−82 (2005).
22
Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704
(2007).
23
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
965, 1037−45 (2004).
24
Id. In a classic example, the New York Court of Appeals refused to grant an
injunction in favor of several dozen neighboring landowners against a polluting cement factory, and restricted their remedy to the payment of permanent damages.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870 (N.Y. 1970)
25
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1381−82 (1993).
26
Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property
in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 96−100 (2003).
27
Id. at 100−02.
28
Ellickson, supra note 25, at 1332−44.
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monitoring and enforcement of appropriation and contribution rules
29
through internal norms, and affirmative portioning of the collectively-owned assets from the private holdings of the stakeholders (es30
pecially in corporations), alongside social and psychological bene31
fits resulting from joint ownership.
Third, recent analysis based on accumulated experience in the
U.S. and throughout the world points to the limits of privatization of
traditionally public resources. Conventional wisdom specified that
because government producers have no high-powered incentives to
32
hold down production costs or to improve the quality of output, increasing involvement of the private sector in the production and fi33
nancing of such resources would enhance efficiency, given also the
34
stimulating effect of competition between different providers.
These assumptions seem to be generally valid for the market provi35
sion of private goods for which profit is the main objective. They
may also hold true for the heavily-regulated yet private provision of
36
public utilities, or for the outsourced provision of pure or mixed
29

OSTROM, supra note 1, at 88−102, 185−92.
This shields the corporation’s assets from the creditors of shareholders. Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J.
387, 393−98 (2000).
31
Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,
573−74 (2001). I definitely do not argue that all property formations usually typified
in the literature as “common property” are identical. In Parts III and IV, I reconceptualize some of these dominant forms as either “private-common” or “publiccommon” mixtures, and I show how commercial corporations, Common Interest
Communities, group-managed fisheries, and Kibbutzim—to name but a few examples of regimes often labeled as “commons”—are in effect very different from one
another.
32
Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1426−29 (2003) (attributing this to citizens’ rational apathy,
the absence of a market for corporate control, and a lack of dependence of public
enterprises on capital to survive).
33
See DONALD F. KETTL, SHARING POWER: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATE
MARKETS 14−17 (1993); E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
111−25 (2000).
34
One should be careful of equating privatization with competition. A private
firm in a certain field of expertise may have no effective competition. On the other
hand, it is possible to have several governmental entities competing to supply a service. See Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and Application to
Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1129 (1997).
35
See William L. Megginson & Jeffrey M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of
Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321 (2001) (offering empirical support for this proposition). There have been, however, notable failures. See Bernard
Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1731 (2000).
36
Public utilities, such as water and electricity, were often portrayed as “natural
monopolies,” not only making open competitive provision inordinately costly, but
30
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37

public goods, whenever the government or the private end-users
38
can effectively evaluate and monitor the quality of output. Nevertheless, there are prominent normative constraints on further extending the scope of reliance on private provision.
These qualifications have special force for goods and services
that involve a complex set of objectives aimed at maximizing social
welfare rather than merely profit, as is the case with education, social
services, managed medical care, police, and prisons. Although in
principle the government could promote these various objectives
through contracts with private suppliers, this complexity often yields
“contract incompleteness,” meaning that the government can neither
easily spell out in a contract the determinants of quality nor can it
39
monitor and enforce such conditions during the service provision.
Consequently, the private supplier, who is chiefly motivated by profit
maximizing, may engage in cost-reducing quality-shading that will of40
ten go unobserved or unpunished. This is especially the case with
41
service components such as inmate rehabilitation or promotion of
42
educational values such as democracy and tolerance, or with the

also creating the problems of a monopoly, which necessitate governmental ownership of the distribution networks, or at least heavy regulation. NEIL BRUCE, PUBLIC
FINANCE AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 41−43 (2d ed. 2001). This conventional wisdom has been challenged in recent literature. Critics argue that such industries were
actually “political monopolies,” as they have historically required legal protection
against competition. See generally THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION
AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H.
Cole eds., 2003).
37
See infra note 102 and accompanying text (offering a definition of public
goods).
38
Examples for such mixed public goods are cleaning and refuse collection. See
Paul H. Jensen & Robin E. Stonecash, Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector Outsourcing Contracts, 19 J. ECON. SURV. 767, 771−72 (2005). In such cases, private suppliers would be punished for cost-cutting deterioration in quality. Hart et al., supra
note 34, at 1144.
39
Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships, 113 ECON. J. 69, 70 (2003); Hart et al., supra note 34,
at 1150−52.
40
Jensen & Stonecash, supra note 38, at 773.
41
See Patrick Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public Versus Private Management, 48 J.L. & ECON. 549, 554 (2005) (arguing that
under standard contracts, a for-profit operator has almost no contractual incentives
to provide rehabilitation opportunities, and demonstrating that the rate of recidivism
for juvenile offenders released from private correctional facilities in Florida is substantially higher than in public facilities).
42
John R. Lott, An Explanation for Private Provision of Schooling: The Importance of
Indoctrination, 33 J.L. & ECON. 199, 210–12 (1990). But cf. Andrei Shleifer, State versus
Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 146−47 (1998) (doubting the benefits of
ideological education).
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cost-reduction bias in the exercising of discretion by private suppliers
regarding expensive-to-treat patients, welfare recipients with low
probability of job placement, or students with special educational
43
needs.
In addition, for even more crystallized components that can be
specifically enumerated in the contract, governments often fail to
44
conduct adequate supervision, and may also be “held up” during
the term of the contract to improve its provisions in favor of the pri45
vate supplier. When the government loses its relevant institutional
knowledge over time, it may be practically unable to take back the
reins, even if it is unsatisfied with the private provision and no viable
46
competition otherwise disciplines the contractor.
Moreover, an excessive delegation of governmental powers to
private entities in the implementation of public programs largely undermines the ability to promote a democratic debate about primary
social priorities and moral judgments, and fails to adequately reflect
47
changes in such values over time. Most of these public programs
are funded publicly—either fully (e.g., welfare) or partially (e.g.,
educational vouchers)—because they are driven by extra-market val48
ues such as vertical equity and the creation of a social “safety net.”
Even services that are publicly financed because they possess the economic traits of public goods (such as preservation of public law and
order through policing and imprisonment) are often intertwined

43

Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1377−94
(2003).
44
See RONALD C. FISHER, STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE 161−62 (3d ed. 2005);
David M. Van Slyke, The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social Services, 63
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 296, 305−08 (2003).
45
Jensen & Stonecash, supra note 38, at 775−77. But cf. Ronald J. Daniels & Michael J. Trebilcock, An Organizational Analysis of the Public-Private Partnership in the Provision of Public Infrastructure, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 93, 102 (Pauline
Vaillancourt Rosenau ed., 2000) (pointing to government opportunism in abrogating contractual commitments).
46
Jonathan Walters, Going Outside, GOVERNING MAG., May 2004, at 23 (discussing
the State of Texas’s plan to pass on to private firms decisionmaking about individual
eligibility for welfare, and contentions that the resulting loss of institutional knowledge may not be retrieved by government).
47
See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1246–55 (2003); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on
Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 421–32 (2006).
48
Stephen H. Linder & Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau, Mapping the Terrain of the
Public-Private Policy Partnership, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 1, 3 (Pauline
Vaillancourt Rosenau ed., 2000).
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with intricate moral considerations that may be inadequately ad49
dressed by both for-profit and not-for-profit private agents.
This is not to say that the lack of high-powered incentives for
50
profit maximization in the public sector yields satisfactory results,
and one may indeed be skeptical as to what extent public officials and
employees are driven by a sense of “mission” that motivates them to51
But this is exactly the point that is
ward quality enhancement.
learned by growing experience: the public-private dilemma is not a
dichotomous struggle in which one side universally prevails. The design of sophisticated public programs, and the identification of the
proper allocation of roles in their design and implementation, is not
only a highly-contextual endeavor, but one that must often result in
the adoption of a mixed regime that seeks to build on the comparative advantages of both types of agents and incentive structures.
B. Mixed Property: Past Experience, Present Potential
The empirical and theoretical evaluation of alternative property
regimes, especially the qualifications of a wholesale embracing of private property regimes, leads to a growing recognition of the need to
craft sophisticated mixed regimes in many contexts. This poses a major challenge to the legal system, which has been very much accustomed to operating in molds that are based on the trilateral distinction between private, common, and public property.
Various mixed property regimes have existed throughout history. One example is the medieval open-field system in northern
Europe, in which peasants owned scattered strips of land for grain
52
growing but used the land collectively for grazing. Another instance
is the common law custom doctrine, according to which residents of
49

Non-profits have been often hailed as combining incentives for efficiency
alongside commitment to public values. Recent research, however, points to problems of unaccountability, lack of competition, insufficient administrative capacity,
and dependence on public funds which can lead to mission drift and diminished
quality. Van Slyke, supra note 44, at 298.
50
See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437,
446–48, 508–16 (2005) (arguing that both public and private prisons fail to meet the
legitimate standards of penal policies and practices in a liberal democracy).
51
See Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Competition and Incentives with Motivated
Agents, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 616, 616–18, 628–30 (2005) (offering the “mission” argument, said to apply to both public bureaucracies and private non-profits). But see
Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 32, at 1447–51 (arguing that private accountability mechanisms, such as competition, cause actors to behave as though publicspirited, whereas public decisionmaking may be distorted by public choice mechanisms).
52
Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2000).
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given localities could claim collective rights to use otherwise private
lands in which group activities had customarily existed without dis53
pute for generations. Colonial and early American cities were corporate-like associations that, along with their distinctive member54
group status, exercised government-like functions. Privately-owned
public utilities and common carriers, holding de facto or de jure monopolistic powers, were traditionally subjected to certain government55
like duties given their “public calling.”
However, the multitude of mixed property regimes designed in
both theory and practice over the past few decades, especially following the disillusionment with the alleged omnipotence of private
property, mandates a distinctive and comprehensive analysis. In the
following parts, I set out to identify prominent patterns of mixed resource ownership and management and to address the major difficulties in legally conceptualizing these regimes to create innovative doctrines.
II. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PROPERTY
A. Property in Public-Private Partnerships
The disadvantages of pure property regimes for the provision of
certain services and goods have led to the rise of public-private mixtures. Especially prominent are newly-crafted forms of Public-Private
Partnerships, such as the British Private Finance Initiative (PFI)
56
57
model, which have spread rapidly in many countries.

53

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 74–75 (facsimile ed. 1979) (1765). Although many of these rights had vanished by the nineteenth century, some survived beyond that, especially in cases of customary recreational uses. Carol Rose, The Comedy of Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 739–44 (1986).
54
During the nineteenth century, American courts developed a public/private
distinction to solve the intermediate nature of corporations by dividing them into
two categories, placing cities in the sphere of the state and private corporations in
the individual sphere. GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES
WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 26–27, 36–45 (1999).
55
CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS:
REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 199–221 (1986).
56
See generally HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, PFI: MEETING THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE
(2003); HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, PFI: STRENGTHENING LONG TERM PARTNERSHIPS
(2006) [hereinafter H.M.F., STRENGTHENING LONG TERM].
57
UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON PRIVATELY FINANCED INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 1–21 (2001) [hereinafter UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE].
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PFI contracts, covering numerous types of public service provision, including health, education, defense, prisons, and roads, have
two major features that are distinct from traditional forms of outsourcing or procurement. First, PFIs are long-term contracts that
bundle design, building, finance, and operation, and are accordingly
performed by a consortium of private firms, unlike the relatively
58
short-term, task-specific outsourcing contracts. Second, in such projects, the government usually uses a system of output specifications by
which it describes the required service and some basic standards, but
it leaves the consortium with wide discretion over how to deliver the
59
service input-wise.
The PFI contract aims at creating a long-enduring socially optimal division of rights, obligations, and liabilities between the par60
ties. Hence, risks are to be borne by the party best placed to manage them, meaning generally that the government underwrites the
continuity of public demand for the service, as well other exogenous
risks (such as a rise in inflation), whereas the private consortium typically assumes endogenous risks, such as construction costs and completion timetable, technological uncertainties, and the satisfaction of
61
By so doing, the “optimal” contract is deoutput requirements.
signed to properly balance risks and incentives: it seeks to mitigate
problems of moral hazard on the part of the private contractor, but
avoids allocating to the contractor types of risks it cannot effectively
control; otherwise the contractor would charge an overly high risk
premium ex ante that would largely negate the social benefits of risk62
shifting to the private sector.
In similar fashion, the incentive structure design is built into the
core rationale of bundling: exploiting synergies between the different
stages of the project, by reducing transaction and coordination costs,
allowing greater freedom from budget allocation and procurement
regulations, and by encouraging innovation in service delivery and
63
adequate maintenance during the contract’s time period.
Here,
however, one must be cautious of the possible drawbacks of this type
58

John Bennett & Elisabetta Lossa, Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services 2–3 (CPMO Working Paper Series No. 05/137, Dec. 2005), available at
http://www.bris.ac.uk/cmpo/workingpapers/wp137.pdf.
59
Id.
60
A.M. Abdel-Aziz & A.D. Russell, A Structure for Government Requirements in PublicPrivate Partnerships, 28 CAN. J. CIV. ENG’G 891 (2001) (mapping the key features of
public-private partnerships along these three dimensions).
61
H.M.F., STRENGTHENING LONG TERM, supra note 56, at 38–40.
62
Jensen & Stonecash, supra note 38, at 777–78.
63
Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 45, at 97–101.
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of vertical integration. One such drawback is reduced competition
64
(because few consortia are able to assemble all the relevant input).
In some instances, inter-stage bundling will not only create positive
cost-reducing externalities for the private consortium, but will also
increase the likelihood of unobservable or unverifiable quality65
shading regarding the fluid components of the contract, in ways
66
even more dramatic than in cases of traditional outsourcing.
Viewed through this prism, the property structure of current
Public-Private Partnerships may be explained by the contract-based
concept of the core of property ownership as consisting of the “residual claim” to the resource at stake. As Yoram Barzel explains, a resource consists of multiple attributes, not all of which are necessarily
captured by contract, and are hence left in the “public domain”—the
party that is able to capture these attributes, in view of such imperfect
contractual delineation of the rights, may in fact be viewed as the residual claimant, or as holding the “economic property rights” to these
67
attributes.
To the extent that the government is contractually able to ensure the required quality of the public benefit from the resource,
providing the private consortium residual control over the project
seems socially desirable, for it allows the consortium to capture benefits such as cost reduction or development of a new technology created through effort or ingenuity without having to renegotiate with
68
the government over this surplus. Conversely, when the consortium
might potentially exploit this in order to substantially decrease the
level of public benefit, the government should work to minimize the
private party’s residual property powers.
One possible way to do so, which follows from the almost inherent incompleteness of many such projects, would be to incorporate
legal standards such as “good faith” or “best efforts” into those portions of the contract especially prone to incompleteness and hence to
64

Id.
See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
66
Bennett & Lossa, supra note 58, at 4–6, 26–28. Hence, bundling is appropriate
when the quality of the public service’s output can be well-specified in the contract,
whereas the quality of the project’s earlier construction stages cannot be so specified.
Hart, supra note 39, at C74.
67
YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 90–96 (2d ed. 1997).
68
Hart et al., supra note 34, at 1129–30; Bennett & Lossa, supra note 58, at 4–5.
But cf. Martin P. Sellers, Privatization Morphs into ‘Publicization’: Businesses Look a Lot
Like Government, 81 PUB. MGMT. 607, 613–16, 618–19 (2003) (arguing that competition for government contracts, and that the considerable governmental control that
creates standardization of contracts often causes private corporations to behave like
governmental agencies, thus losing the potential benefits of market differentiation).
65
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69

socially sub-optimal provision. Although an overuse of vague standards may decrease the willingness of private parties to enter into
such partnerships or may otherwise affect the contract’s pricing and
risk allocation, the substantial growth in discretion awarded to private
parties in controlling access to governmental resources and benefits
should be matched with normatively modest yet generally effective
mechanisms aimed at resembling the basic principles of judicial re70
view of administrative decision-making.
Another prominent property issue in Public-Private Partnerships
concerns formal ownership of the resource at the end of the contract
period. The British position for PFI contracts is that the government
should take ownership of assets where the future long-term, publicsector demand is clear or where there is no realistic alternative use, as
is the case with roads, schools, hospitals, prisons, and specialist in71
formation technology systems. This regime is also highly prevalent
for such resources in the U.S. and Canada, where it is typically de72
fined as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contract, and also for
73
large infrastructure projects throughout the world. Conversely, the
residual value of the resource at the end of the PFI contract period is
considered to be best transferred to the consortium for assets which
have alternative uses—such as office accommodation in areas that
have private sector demand or generic information technology sys74
tems—and for which there is no clear long-term public need.
Obviously, post-contract governmental ownership of the resource has its price tag, since it adversely influences the consortium’s
investment incentives ex ante, meaning that the government has to
compensate the private party initially by setting up a long contract
75
term or by ensuring higher periodic revenues for the consortium.
69

See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of
Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 189–91, 196–98 (2005) (arguing that
when the parties have incomplete information in the pre-contract negotiations, they
should opt for standards in the contract, trading front-end negotiation costs with the
back-end, typically lower litigation costs).
70
See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
71
HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, STANDARDIZATION OF PFI CONTRACTS 125–27 (2004)
[hereinafter H.M.T., STANDARDIZATION ].
72
See PHILIP LANE BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 6.9 (2002) (offering a taxonomy of BOTs and closely related
schemes).
73
See Abdel-Aziz & Russell, supra note 60 (reviewing several projects);
UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 57.
74
H.M.T., STANDARDIZATION, supra note 71, at 125–27. This pattern is generally
known in the U.S as a Build-Own-Operate (BOO) contract. BRUNER & O’CONNOR,
supra note 72, § 6.10.
75
Bennett & Lossa, supra note 58, at 27.
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This facet of the resource’s residual value further constrains the government in evaluating the public benefit embedded in the project
76
and in constructing the project’s specific property structure.
Current forms of Public-Private Partnerships may therefore be
located at the central segments of the public-private continuum, as
the following chart suggests:
Public

public resources (financing +
production)

Private

traditional,
task-specific
outsourcing

Public-Private
Partnerships +
residual public
rights

Public-Private
Partnerships +
residual private
rights

heavily regulated
private
private industries resources,
(monopolies/ sub- standard
sidized provision) regulation

Chart 1
The Public-Private Continuum
To complete the property framework, however, these hybrid
structures cannot be examined solely from the bilateral contract perspective. Rather, the public side of the regime has to be further broken down to distinguish, in appropriate cases, between the government and the individuals who have a distinctive interest in the public
program in a way that would shed light on the role that the latter parties may play as potential “residual claimants” to the resource at stake.
B. Individual Beneficiaries as Property Stakeholders
Public programs diverge in their implications for individual
members of the general public of the relevant jurisdiction. In some
cases, the benefits resulting from the public program are generally
indivisible and accrue to the members of the public at large. This is
the case, for example, with the preservation of law and order through
77
policing and imprisonment.

76

See Timothy Besley & Mairteesh Ghatak, Government Versus Private Ownership of
Public Goods, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1343 (2001) (arguing that the party with the highest
valuation for the project should be its owner, irrespective of the parties’ relative levels of financial investment in it).
77
FISHER, supra note 44, at 46–48.
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In many cases, however, the public products of the program are
translated into individually-based distinctive benefits. Public utilities
serve specific consumers, and public education, welfare, and medical
care benefit certain individuals, as does the rehabilitation component
78
of imprisonment services. While in these latter cases, where there
also exists a more general public gain (e.g., the societal advantage of
having better-educated citizens), one can still discern individual
stakeholders whose interest in the program stands out from that of
the general public. To understand how such individual interests in
the benefits of the public program may implicate mixed property regimes, we must first identify the normative basis of individual entitlements to the public program when provided directly by the government, and then make a second-stage normative analysis of publicprivate provision of these services. 79
The spectrum of public programs is obviously too wide in scope
to allow for even a brief yet fair taxonomy within this Article. Yet,
what generally characterizes governmentally-provided services and
goods is the myriad of legal norms governing their provision. Alongside contractual or quasi-contractual individual entitlements and responsibilities that apply to some of the governmental resources (such
as common carriers, utilities, or medical care), individual entitlements to governmental resources and to their various attributes are
further governed by constitutional, statutory, and administrative
norms. Hence, for example, the scope of judicial recognition of procedural due process rights for beneficiaries of certain types of social
welfare, in view of their “property” interest in such programs, 80 has
78

Beyond services such as rehabilitation or medical treatment, inmates have an
obvious interest in other issues pertaining to their imprisonment, such as the physical quality of the facilities, control of violence, and preservation of human dignity.
See Dolovich, supra note 50, at 471–502. Since privatization may implicate these interests, especially because of the possible de-constitutionalization of prison managerial activities, the debate over privatization extends also to such interests. Id.
79
Although using the public provision benchmark may be controversial whenever there are reasons to think that it is in itself unsatisfactory, it may be still useful
for isolating the impact of the transition to public-private provision on the beneficiaries’ entitlements in the program.
80
The Supreme Court first recognized procedural due process rights for welfare
recipients based on the “property” framework in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). However, in later cases the Court narrowed the application of this right by
reasoning that the “property” interest is not created by the Constitution, but is rather
created and defined by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
This positive law definition of the “property” interest allows the government to statutorily design the program in a way that would deprive its beneficiaries of procedural
due process protection. RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 598–615 (4th ed. 2002). The Court has also offered a more recent analy-
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obvious implications on the property rights division between the gov81
ernment and the individual beneficiaries. Another prominent issue
has been the application of the constitutional equal protection duty
regarding, for example, municipal services or common carriers,
whenever unequal provision is claimed to systematically adversely af82
fect members of protected classes.
Beyond the application of such norms to drastic cases of explicit
termination or systematic deprivation in the provision of governmental goods and services, the property structure of these programs is designed by practices and norms governing the routine provision of
such services—and especially those “grey areas” that may substantially
implicate the quality and quantity of the services—in a way that indicates who may be viewed as the “residual claimant” to the resource.
Thus, for instance, as courts give greater deference to administrative
discretion in implementing such services (e.g., quality of inmate rehabilitation programs), 83 and also to administrative interpretation of
84
ambiguous provisions in the statute creating the public program,
the “property bundle” that the individual possesses in the resource’s
attributes gets smaller. Conversely, the existence of effective mechanisms curbing governmental quality-shading in servicing beneficiaries
strengthens individual entitlements to the resource.
Thus, whenever a decision to move to public-private collaboration
in the provision of a certain governmental program is not accompa-

sis of this “property” interest. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748
(2005) (holding that a wife did not have a protected “property” interest in police enforcement of a restraining order against an abusive husband).
81
See Richard H. Fallon, Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 327–55 (1993) (discussing the confused
relationships between procedural due process resulting from a “property” interest
and substantive due process claims).
82
In Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit concluded from statistical evidence that municipal services had been provided to different neighborhoods in a racially discriminatory manner. 437 F.2d 1286,
1288 (5th Cir. 1971). However, following the Supreme Court’s later decision in
Washington v. Davis, plaintiffs are generally required to prove discriminatory intent
beyond merely a disparate impact. 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). Compare Ammons v.
Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 983 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding “discriminatory intent” in the
provision of municipal services based on statistical, circumstantial, and historical evidence), with N.Y. Urban League v. State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1033 (2d Cir.
1995) (refusing to reach similar conclusions about the allocation of public funds to
mass transit in the New York City area).
83
See Dolovich, supra note 50, at 484 –90 (discussing the narrow interpretation of
constitutional rights of inmates, even in cases of serious physical harm, let alone in
services such as rehabilitation).
84
See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44
(1984).
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nied by an explicit policy choice to affect a change in the individual
beneficiaries’ general status, the mixed property regime must be ad85
justed to maintain the individual “legitimate claim of entitlement”
within the property framework.
What form should such beneficiaries’ rights take in the mixed
property setting? While resorting to more generalized mechanisms
of “public accountability” aimed at fostering a public discourse about
the underlying values of the public program may not give sufficient
86
account to adversely affected interests of individual stakeholders, a
universal application of the “state actor” doctrine to private entities
87
contracting with the government, let alone a straightforward exten88
sion of public law into realms traditionally thought private, may
89
have undesirable overreaching consequences.
A more promising route is that of a careful development of the
contract-based third-party beneficiary doctrine to cases in which public-private provision of goods and services may undermine otherwise
recognized individual entitlements. Traditionally, courts have been
reluctant to accord individual members of the public rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of governmental contracts to perform services,
90
unless the specific contract made it clear that this was intended.
This approach was driven, inter alia, by the fear of a multitude of
claims and a chilling effect on the private party being contractually
91
obligated to a limitless number of third parties. However, as of the
1970s, the judiciary has shown gradual signs of willingness to apply
this doctrine to government contracts. Probably not surprisingly, this

85

Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
See Minow, supra note 47, at 1259–63 (calling for the assurance of “public accountability” in Public-Private Partnerships).
87
For the narrow application of the “state action” doctrine in such contexts, see
Sheila S. Kennedy, When is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 203, 208–19 (2001); Metzger,
supra note 43, at 1421–37.
88
See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1315–29 (2003) (suggesting that privatization might extend public values to private actors to ensure that Public-Private Partnerships are structured in
democracy-enhancing ways).
89
See Metzger, supra note 43, at 1421–37 (suggesting that “constitutional accountability” does not necessitate direct application of constitutional norms to the
private party, and can be achieved by judicially requiring the government to create
mechanisms protecting against private abuses).
90
A classic case in point is H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., in which the New
York Court of Appeals rejected a claim by an owner of a warehouse which was
burned down because the water company that contracted with the city failed to
maintain adequate water pressure at its hydrants. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
91
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 688–91 (3d ed. 1999).
86
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was done chiefly in the context of contracts for the provision of social
assistance programs, of the kind that have been generally recognized
92
as falling within the “new property” framework.
The employment of the third-party beneficiary doctrine seems to
have special appeal with the increase in number and complexity of
public-private contracts. As more government contracts become substantially incomplete by nature and entrust private entities with considerable discretion over the implementation of complicated public
programs, there is growing justification for enabling individual beneficiaries to effectively monitor quality-shading and to capture at least
some of the value located in the “grey areas” of the contract. In so
doing, individual beneficiaries may also be better motivated to enforce vague standards included in the contract, such standards typically requiring the plaintiff to gather substantial information about
both the specific contract’s implementation and general practices in
similar programs. 93
To mitigate the fear of over-fragmentation of the public program’s structure, resulting in an anticommons scenario, the remedies
awarded in cases of successful litigation initiated by individual beneficiaries should be collective and nonpecuniary whenever possible,
aimed at redirecting both the government and the private partner
toward a proper implementation of the public program. Hence, for
example, contract-based judgments over issues such as managed
medical care, school curriculum, or prison rehabilitation services
should be generally oriented toward broad standard-setting that will
illuminate the public-private contract based on the public program’s
statutory (or other) basis, beyond the individual grievance that may
have been the genesis of the litigation.
In conclusion, the broadening reality of public-private property
regimes realigns the property rights to such restructured resources.
While legally validating the private providers’ residual claim to such
92

See, e.g., Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981) (viewing tenants of
housing projects that are beneficiaries of the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Section 8 rental assistance programs as direct third-party beneficiaries of the contracts between HUD and the project owners).
93
See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (setting forth the justifications to
include vague standards in Public-Private Partnerships contracts). However, this tactic might entail potential problems, such as moral hazard, occurring whenever the
existence of vague standards would cause a party to strategically second-guess the
original contract through ex post litigation. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 601–03 (2003). This problem
might be especially acute in the case of third-party beneficiaries, who can only benefit from ex post challenges to the contract and do not face the direct risk of contractbreaching.
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resources may be socially optimal at times, in other instances contractual incompleteness or lax public monitoring may undermine public
benefits, resulting in inefficient or unjust outcomes. In such latter
cases, the incentives of individual beneficiaries to monitor the new
regime given their concentrated interest in the public program
should be facilitated by developing procedural and substantive rights
aimed at bringing economic and legal reality to terms with the desirable social policy.
III. PRIVATE-COMMON PROPERTY
Similar to the public-private setting, various forms of mixed private-common regimes have emerged over the past few decades. Interestingly, the movement toward such interim regimes is made from
both poles of the private-common continuum. In this Part, I analyze
two prominent case studies, which vary substantially in their historical
and institutional background and also diverge in the explanation of
motives for the shift, as well as in their post-transition results. Nevertheless, both case studies illustrate the potential for mixed regimes to
better meet current preferences.
The first case study is the rapidly-growing dominance of Common
Interest Communities (CICs) at the expense of traditional residential
neighborhoods. The second is the recent growth of the semiprivatized Renewing Kibbutz, alongside the “classic” cooperative Kibbutz. This analysis has potential implications that may aid in reframing and reassessing dilemmas regarding other forms of privatecommon regimes, including the ever-complicated relationships between the modern private corporation and its individual stakeholders.
A. The Common Interest Community as Residual Claimant
With more than 286,000 CICs housing fifty-seven million resi94
dents in the U.S. nowadays, private developments governed by
homeowners associations have come to dominate much of the resi95
dential landscape. The core of the community property governance
lies in the conditions, covenants, and restrictions (CC&Rs) included
in the CIC’s Declaration, which forms a part of the community’s gov94

Community Associations Institution, Data on U.S. Associations, http://www.
caionline.org/about/facts.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
95
For works on the evolution of CICs, see COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES:
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE COMMON INTEREST (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J.
Silverman eds., 1994); EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND
THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS (1994).
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96

erning documents. As will be shown, these servitudes typically control and regulate commonly-owned assets and amenities, as well as
the use of privately-owned housing units. Beyond these pre-fixed
provisions, the community-based governance of collective and private
properties has a dynamic dimension. This is because the CIC’s institutions generally have power not only to enforce the terms of the
Declaration, but also to make managerial decisions, promulgate
rules, and amend the Declaration without a need for unanimous
97
homeowners’ consent.
The unique property structure of CICs has many facets, not all of
which will be analyzed elaborately here. However, one such issue
arousing substantial interest concerns the nature and extent of the
powers and practices of CICs vis-à-vis outsiders. This is especially
relevant because CICs are often criticized as a “secession of the suc98
99
cessful,” “government for the nice,” and so forth, referring to formal and informal exclusionary mechanisms employed by such private
100
communities.
The internal property structure of the CIC, which is the focus of
this discussion, aims at solving a host of collective action problems
that neighbors typically face in residential neighborhoods. These can
be divided roughly into the (1) establishment and management of
common amenities, such as streets, parks, and sport facilities, and (2)
control of intra-neighborhood externalities resulting from the use of
96

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT, SERVITUDES].
97
Id. §§ 6.4–6.14.
98
Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the “Secession of the Successful”: Democracy and Fairness beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675 (2001).
99
Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and its Discontents: Common Interest Communities
and the Rise of the Government for “The Nice,” 37 URB. LAW. 335 (2005).
100
Overt mechanisms may include gates and fences physically isolating the community. See EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY G. SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997). Formal sorting of community members
is achieved by associational provisions that set up, for example, age restrictions or
bans on convicted sex offenders. See, e.g., Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condo. Ass’n, 81
Cal. App. 3d. 688 (1978) (upholding an amendment to a condominium bylaw restricting occupancy to persons age eighteen or older); Brett Jackson Coppage, Balancing Community Interests and Offenders’ Rights: The Validity of Covenants Restricting Sex
Offenders from Residing in a Neighborhood, 38 URB. LAW. 309 (2006). Other exclusionary
measures are informal, operating mainly through the price mechanism, which regularly keeps out low-income families, due both to the typical lack of subsidized affordable housing in such projects, and to the significant premium consumers are willing
to pay for homes in CICs. Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and
Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 334 (1998); see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006) (discussing
other informal sorting mechanisms).
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privately-owned units. The mixed nature of the CIC property regime
manifests itself, therefore, in the close inter-connectivity between
group-owned and privately-owned assets within the compounds of the
CIC, as well as in the extensive group governance of privately-owned
assets, which typically goes well beyond conventional public governance of residential private properties.
1.

Controlling Commonly-Owned Assets . . .

As for the commonly-owned assets, the collective action challenges which the CIC tackles through the mechanisms of built-in servitudes and group governance can be divided into two phases, which
somewhat diverge in their nature.
The first phase is the efficient creation of community-level
101
amenities.
For some of these assets, such as inner streets, which
more genuinely possess the economic traits of public goods—
102
nonexcludability and nonrivalry —the existence of reciprocal duties
of contribution solves the inherent market failure that usually necessitates governmental production and financing through imposition of
103
taxes. As for “club goods” such as sport facilities, which can be usually provided by the market in ordinary residential settings, the internal group provision of such amenities is a significant cost-cutting de104
vice for CIC residents.
The second phase of collective action in this context concerns
the on-going maintenance, protection, and improvement of the
commonly-owned assets. Here, the contractual contribution mechanisms, together with the association’s regulatory powers over the use
of these amenities, aim at confronting the “tragic” dynamics of under105
investment and over-use in these resources.

101

Such amenities therefore constitute local public goods, the effects of which involve a limited, local geographical area. See ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN, URBAN ECONOMICS
457–60 (4th ed. 2000); see also infra note 102 and accompanying text (defining public
goods).
102
Nonexcludability means that there is no feasible way to prevent people from
enjoying the good even if they refuse to pay for it; nonrivalry means that the marginal cost of an additional consumer is zero or close to it. BRUCE, supra note 36, at
56–57.
103
Club goods become congested (hence rival) from a relatively small number of
users; they are also typically feasibly excludable. RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER,
THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND CLUB GOODS 347–51 (2d ed. 1996).
104
Such costs are also influenced by the willingness of the relevant government to
adjust the CIC members’ public taxes against services provided by the CIC. Cashin,
supra note 98, at 1677–78.
105
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); see also Lee
Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 913–25, 941–52
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The condition of group-owned assets has obvious implications for
the “holy grail” of the CIC members’ private interests: their home
values. Both assurance of ongoing, stable and cost-saving provision of
common amenities and protection against intra-neighborhood externalities play a major role in protecting and enhancing the home106
owners’ property values.
2. . . . and Privately-Owned Ones
The most unique property feature of planned residential communities is probably the extensive group governance of private property, which typically comes in addition to, and not in lieu of, the applicable public regulation, such as land use controls, nuisance law, or
environmental regulations. The community provisions may include
aesthetic controls of the external shape, design, and color of the
107
housing units; limits or flat prohibitions on the possession of
108
pets; restrictions on outside storage or display of certain items such
109
as unused cars; or limits on other types of activities which are not
110
regularly prohibited by law.
These restrictions are designed to combat potential adverse spillover effects which do not conform to the community members’ general tastes or preferences, hence preventing individual members from
exercising the effective privilege of use they would have otherwise
possessed in these attributes of their resources. The creation of a
mixed property regime for the use of privately-owned assets is therefore not (or at least does not purport to be) detached from the reciprocal interests in adjacent privately-owned assets or in the common
assets. It is designed to leave to the private owner power over matters,
the positive and negative effects of which he fully internalizes, but at
the same time it transfers to the group decision-making powers,

(2004) [hereinafter Fennell, Tragedies] (offering a good recent analysis of the commons problem).
106
In a recent survey, seventy-eight percent of CIC residents said that their CIC’s
rules “protect and enhance” property values. Only one percent said these rules
“harm” property values. ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL, HOMEOWNERSHIP AND ASSOCIATION
LIVING: HOA MEMBERS AND HOMEOWNERS NATIONWIDE 21 (2005), http://www.cairf.
org/research/zogby.pdf.
107
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 593–96 (3d ed.
2005).
108
See infra notes 113–116 and accompanying text.
109
See, e.g., Shafer v. Bd. of Trs. of Sandy Hook Yacht Club Estates, Inc., 883 P.2d
1387 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
110
Theoretically, CICs can use the covenant mechanisms also to allow certain activities that are otherwise prohibited by law, but this is rarely the case. ELLICKSON &
BEEN, supra note 107, at 596.
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which go substantially beyond the traditional sphere of public intervention in private property and are based on the community’s idio111
syncratic definition of adverse externalities.
Put differently, the greater the legal latitude granted to CICs in
controlling and governing private property, the more we can view the
community as the “residual claimant” to the allegedly private assets.
Accordingly, the group capture of the rent stemming from various attributes of a certain housing unit enhances the value of other private
properties. At least theoretically, this state of affairs aims at having a
reciprocal nature, making every member of the community better off
than in a no-group-regulation scenario.
The residual nature of group control may manifest itself not only
in awarding the association broad-based discretionary powers over
112
matters such as aesthetic approvals, but also in the ability of the association to change the rules of the game during the lifetime of the
project, including by promulgation of rules or amendments to the
Declaration on a non-unanimous basis. For instance, in Villa De Las
113
Palmas Homeowners Ass’n v. Terifaj, the California Supreme Court
upheld a majority-approved amendment to the condominium’s Declaration, imposing a no-pet restriction. In so doing, the court, viewing use restrictions as “crucial to the stable, planned environment of
114
any shared ownership arrangement,” held that “all homeowners are
bound by amendments adopted and recorded subsequent to pur115
chase,” and that the statutory-based deferential standard according
to which the covenants and restrictions in the Declaration shall be
enforceable “unless unreasonable” applies equally to later amend-

111

The Restatement conceptualizes limits on the use of private property as imposing an “indirect restraint on alienation” of the property, which is valid unless it “lacks
a rational justification.” RESTATEMENT, SERVITUDES, supra note 96, § 3.5. This is distinguished from “direct restraints,” which include prohibitions or constraints on the
transfer of land, which are invalid if the restraint is “unreasonable.” Id. § 3.4. State
jurisdictions vary on the subject. In California, for example, any restraint included in
a CIC’s Declaration is valid “unless unreasonable.” CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1354(a) (West
2005); see also ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 107, at 553–62.
112
This does not mean, however, that aesthetic standards can be wholly vague. See
Town & Country Estates Ass’n v. Slater, 740 P.2d 668 (Mont. 1987) (striking-down a
CIC’s aesthetic requirement of “harmony of external design . . . to surrounding
structures” as too vague). But cf. Oakbrook Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Sonnier, 481 So. 2d
1008 (La. 1986) (upholding a similar covenant).
113
90 P.3d 1223 (Cal. 2004).
114
Id. at 1228.
115
Id. at 1229.
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116

ments.
This approach, which is followed in many other jurisdic117
tions, means that even if the original governing documents of the
CIC leave grey areas allowing individual privileges of use that adversely affect the neighborhood commons, those gaps may be later
118
non-unanimously narrowed by the community institutions.
Such community-wide rules and regulations may be seen as grant119
ing a property rule protection against restricted uses in favor of the
community, or more exactly, in favor of the number of residents
whose aggregate votes are needed in the association’s decisionmaking process to abolish the restriction or to make an exception to
it (that is, a majority of the association’s board members when the
change is made through regular rulemaking, or a majority—simple
or special—of homeowners when an amendment to the Declaration
120
is required).
This property rule protection is, however, problematic from an
efficiency viewpoint whenever the value that a certain resident attributes to the enjoined use (e.g., painting the exterior of her house pink
in an all-white-paint CIC) outweighs the harm expected to other
community members. Should the resident try to collect the consent
needed to overturn the restriction, she is likely to face an anticommons scenario, in view of the fact that the legal power to allow it is
121
dispersed among various members.
The resulting “one-directional
stickiness in the fragmentation process” creates substantial transaction and strategic costs, which hamper consensual correction of an
122
inefficient baseline. Although, as mentioned, the governance struc-

116

Id. at 1232–34. This means that such amendments to the Declaration are presumptively valid, and the burden of proving otherwise rests upon the challenging
homeowner. Id.
117
See, e.g., Riverside Park Condos. Unit Owners Ass’n v. Lucas, 691 N.W.2d 862
(N.D. 2005).
118
One needs, however, to differentiate between amendments to the Declaration
and rule promulgating. Rules imposing later use restrictions on private property
must be “reasonable” to be valid, thus placing the onus of proof on the CIC.
RESTATEMENT, SERVITUDES, supra note 96, § 6.7.
119
Property rule protection means that the entitlement cannot be taken away
from the party holding it without her consent. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115–17 (1972).
120
See RESTATEMENT, SERVITUDES, supra note 96, § 6.10 (giving a survey of the different types of majorities needed to amend the Declaration).
121
This phenomenon is really unsurprising: an antincommons setting of overfragmentation of rights often follows an institutional response to a previous commons problem. Fennell, Tragedies, supra note 105, at 926.
122
Francesco Parisi et al., Commons and Anticommons, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 578,
585–86 (2006).
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ture of the CIC does not normally require unanimous consent to allow such extraordinary use, the process of consent assembly is nevertheless complicated, given also the conservative bias that seems to
characterize CIC members for undoing restrictions imposed on pri123
vate uses.
Suggested solutions to such a limited anticommons scenario,
based also on a switch to a liability rule (monetary compensation) re124
gime, are far from simple.
One possible way to somewhat mitigate
the tension between the need to preserve the overall efficient groupbased control of private uses and the fear of case-specific inefficiencies may be based on an analogy from cases of deviations from public
125
regulation following consent among neighbors.
Specifically, whenever a resident in a CIC is able to demonstrate that her immediate
neighbors do not oppose the extraordinary use, including following
contractual side payments, such sub-group consent may serve as a
prima facie case against the association’s insistence on applying the
restriction. In such case, the burden that the restriction is not “unreasonable” or “irrational” as applied to the specific tract would be
passed to the community, which should demonstrate a broader effect
on the CIC to override the sub-group consent. Such an adaptation
of current law may enable CICs to handle some level of heterogeneity
in tastes and preferences, an issue which is liable to grow in importance as the number of CICs continues to increase to the point of becoming the default in designing new residential neighborhoods.
B. The Renewing Kibbutz: Mixed Ideology, Mixed Property
The Israeli cooperative Kibbutz is often considered the quintessential example of a long-enduring form of secular intentional com126
munity maintaining a pure common property regime.
Originating
in 1910, the agriculture-based Kibbutzim played a major role during
123

See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1464–68
(2005) (suggesting seting up a “callable call” option regime between the homeowner
and the community, which would be based on a periodic self-assessment by the
homeowner of the use’s value, but admitting that this mechanism may be prone to
problems of complexity and strategic evaluations).
125
See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 107, at 393–400 (discussing neighbors’ consent requirement in some jurisdictions to allow for certain extraordinary uses which
do not conform to the zoning ordinance); id. at 534 (discussing neighbors bargaining around nuisance law rules).
126
This is unlike other types of secular communities that have been generally
short-lasting; communities with religious intentions tend to fare better. See Robert C.
Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE
L. J. 226, 271–76 (2006).
124
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the formative years before and after the 1948 establishment of the
State of Israel, and were viewed by Israeli leadership as realizing the
127
ultimate Zionist ideal.
A cooperative association, the Kibbutz is
formally defined as a “settlement which is based on the ideas of collective ownership, self-work, and equal sharing in production, con128
sumption, and education.”
The communal and egalitarian nature
of the Kibbutz manifested itself in all areas of life, originally implementing a socialist ideology that attributed a central distinctive quality to the collective enterprise going beyond—and often at the ex129
pense of—satisfying individual preferences and interests.
The
cooperative regime has been enforced through various mechanisms
of social control, including substantial limits on entry to and exit
130
from membership in the Kibbutz’s association, as well as other
131
types of formal and informal norms.
The Kibbutz movement is currently in the midst of a process of
dramatic change, leading to the evolution of a new type of Kibbutz,
now formally known as the “Renewing Kibbutz,” alongside the old132
style cooperative Kibbutz.
The Renewing Kibbutz started out as a
spontaneous, informal phenomenon in numerous cooperative Kib133
butzim as of the 1980s in response to an on-going crisis. Prominent
among the economic and political causes for this crisis were the sharp
decline in the profitability of agriculture; internal mismanagement
which brought many Kibbutzim to insolvency; loss of governmental
favoritism with the rise to power of the right-wing laissez-faire127

See generally HENRY NEAR, 2 THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT: A HISTORY (1997).
Cooperative Associations Ordinances (Types of Associations), § 2(5)(a), 1995,
KT 5722, 246 [hereinafter Types of Associations].
129
See YONINA TALMON, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY IN THE KIBBUTZ 207–08 (1972).
130
Israeli courts have rarely interfered with membership decisions made by Kibbutzim, including decisions to remove members, in view of these cooperative associations’ allegedly voluntary nature and the judicially-recognized importance of maintaining social harmony and collective discipline. See, e.g., HCJ 4222/95 Palatin v.
Registrar of Coop. Ass’ns [1998], IsrSC 52(5) 614, 620; CA 8398/00 Katz v. Kibbutz
Ein-Tzurim [2002], IsrSC 56(6) 602, 623.
131
See TALMON, supra note 129, at 2–3. The Kibbutz is a classic example of what
Robert Ellickson has termed a “close-knit group,” that is, a “social network whose
members have credible and reciprocal prospects for the application of power against
one another and a good supply of information on past and present internal events.”
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 177–83
(1991). This allowed the Kibbutz members to engage in a complex network of informal norms, which helped to enforce the group’s formal rules.
132
Amnon Lehavi, New Residential Communities in Israel: Between Privatization and
Exclusion, 2 HAIFA L. REV. 63, 78–89 (2005) (Hebrew).
133
See Public Committee on Kibbutzim, A Report on the Kibbutzim 24–39 (Aug.
2003), available at http://www.globes.co.il/serve/nadlan/tikunim/kibiz.doc (Hebrew).
128
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oriented Likud party in the late 1970s; and real estate pressures following the rise in demand for land for residential and commercial
developments, especially affecting Kibbutzim located at the urban
134
fringe.
But not less important were socio-ideological factors: the
demise in the fundamental socialist ethos among younger generations; an internal tension due to the growing gaps in productivity
among various members (especially after many turned to nonagricultural pursuits outside the Kibbutz, but had to keep passing on
their salaries to the collective coffer); and the desire of many middleage members to bequeath assets to their children in an era of eco135
nomic uncertainty.
This led to substantial rates of member with136
drawal and mounting pressures for change.
As a result, numerous Kibbutzim started to carry out grassroots
organizational reforms, including setting up a differential personal
budget system; partial privatization of certain services such as health,
education, and meals; allocation of individual shares in the Kibbutz’s
productive assets; and the taking of initial steps to change the Kib137
butz’s land tenure system.
These spontaneous changes raised substantial difficulties not only because they were not formally approved
beforehand by the Kibbutzim’s national organizations, but also because they allegedly conflicted with the formal definition of the Kibbutz in various statutes, ordinances, and agreements made with gov138
ernmental and other public entities.
To resolve the issue, the Israeli Cabinet appointed a public committee which was asked to review these de facto changes and to offer
139
a new formal policy.
In 2004, the Cabinet approved the committee’s recommendations, which largely validated the grassroots modes
140
of change.
Consequently, the applicable legislation and administrative ordinances were amended to formally incorporate the Renewing Kibbutz as a new type of a cooperative association, alongside the
141
cooperative Kibbutz.
Currently, about two-thirds of Israel’s 266
134

Lehavi, supra note 132, at 78–80.
A Report on the Kibbutzim , supra note 133, at 24–25.
136
See generally ELIEZER BEN-REPHAEL, CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION: THE KIBBUTZ AT
THE CENTURY’S END (1997); CRISIS IN THE ISRAELI KIBBUTZ: MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF
CHANGING TIMES (Uriel Levithan et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter CRISIS].
137
A Report on the Kibbutzim, supra note 133, at 28–33 (discussing these changes
and their implications)
138
Id. at 33–37.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 5–10. The Cabinet approved the recommendations in Decision no. 1736
on March 28, 2004. Id.
141
The definition of the Renewing Kibbutz is now included in the Cooperative
Associations Ordinances. Types of Associations, supra note 128, § 2(5)(b).
135
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Kibbutzim generally conform to the definition of a Renewing Kib142
butz.
The Renewing Kibbutz is characterized by one or more of the following mixed property features, which reflect its updated, mixed-type
normative stance:
First, the Renewing Kibbutz may allocate individual budgets to its
members pursuant to the “extent of their contribution, positions, and
143
[time-based] seniority.”
This flexible provision, aimed at motivating individual productivity, is subject to the duty of the Kibbutz to
maintain a mechanism of “reciprocal guarantee” in the allocation of
funds, ensuring a minimal economic safety net for all members and
144
providing for the needs of the elderly and the disabled. This mixed
regime may be seen therefore as shaping rules of allocation combining a “desert” principle, which is characteristic of utilitarian-based
groups alongside a “need” criterion, typical of groups with high inter145
personal solidarity, hence maintaining the socialist ideology at
midway. This compromise is, however, far from easy. Even with the
modifying redistributive mechanisms intact, the budget gaps can still
be extremely large within a single Kibbutz, creating new causes for in146
ternal tension. This departure from the egalitarian principle of the
cooperative Kibbutz may therefore also have obvious implications on
the communality and solidarity in the life of the Kibbutz, raising
doubts about the long-term viability of this version of mixed house147
hold management.
Second, the Renewing Kibbutz is entitled to privatize its housing
units. To briefly explain, the tenure system in agricultural lands in
148
Israel is one of public leasehold.
The lands, managed by Israel
142

See KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT YEARBOOK NO. 3, 45–48 (2006), available at
http://www.kibbutz.org.il/calcala/shnaton/060628_shnaton_2006.pdf (Hebrew).
143
Types of Associations, supra note 128, § 2(5)(b)(1).
144
Cooperative Associations Ordinances (Reciprocal Guarantee in a Renewing
Kibbutz), 2005, KT 6445, 190.
145
See DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 25–32 (2001).
146
See Amiran Cohen & Eli Ashkenazi, Kibbutz Wage Gaps as High as 700 Percent,
HAARETZ.COM (Eng. ed.), Oct. 25, 2004.
147
See, e.g., Eli Ashkenazi, Kibbutzim Worried about Disabled Members, HAARETZ (Eng.
Online ed.), Jan. 15, 2006; Eli Ashkenazi, To be or not to be Cooperative, Kibbutz Movement Wonders, HAARETZ.COM (Eng. ed.) May 18, 2006.
148
Before the establishment of the State of Israel, Jews acquired lands mainly
through philanthropic and private corporations. See generally Ruth Kark, Planning,
Housing, and Land Policy 1948-1952: The Formation of Concepts and Governmental Frameworks, in ISRAEL—THE FIRST DECADE OF INDEPENDENCE 461–94 (Ian Troen & Noah Lucas eds., 1995) (giving a history of the formation of Israel Lands). Most prominent
was the Jewish National Fund (JNF), established in 1901. Id. Up until 1948, the JNF
acquired approximately 933,000 dunams (230,000 acres), with the intention that the
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149

Lands Administration (ILA), are leased for renewable short-term
periods (typically three years each), and the use by the lessee is gen150
erally restricted to agriculture and accompanying housing.
The
cooperative Kibbutz has traditionally entered such short-term renewable agreements with the ILA. Because of the collective nature of the
Kibbutz, the various members were purposely not a part of the lease
agreement, and had no individual rights in the land whatsoever, in151
cluding in the housing units provided by the Kibbutz.
Any conversion of the short-term collective leases into a series of long-term individually-based ones therefore necessitates consent by the public
landowner, alongside an internal restructuring in the Kibbutz.
The ILA gave its initial consent for such a transition, according to
which individual leases would be entered for the various housing
units, whereas the rest of the Kibbutz’s area would continue to be
152
leased collectively.
However, this 1996 decision had little practical
effect, not only because it preceded the formal redefinition of the
Kibbutz, but also because it set up substantial capitalization fees (i.e.,
an up-front payment for the entire lease period), which proved simland would stay under the Jewish People’s common ownership in perpetuity, and
that land would be leased to Jewish settlers for a period of forty-nine years. Id. After
1948, the Israeli government took various steps to nationalize lands, with the similar
intent that State land would not be sold, but only leased—a notion formally entrenched in the Basic Law: Israel Lands, 1960, S.H. 56. Id. Currently, ninety-three
percent of the entire land in Israel, and nearly 100 percent of agricultural lands, is
owned by either the State, the Development Authority (a State-held statutory entity),
or the JNF. Id. These lands are defined collectively as “Israel Lands.” Id.
149
The ILA is the administrative agency charged with managing all Israel Lands,
including those owned by JNF. Israel Lands Administration Law, 1960, S.H. 57.
150
Contrarily, state-held urban lands are leased for long periods, most leases being in the form of a “capitalized leasing,” meaning that the lessee pays a single, upfront payment for the entire period. See Gilat Benchetrit & Daniel Czamanski, The
Gradual Abolition of the Public Leasehold System in Israel and Canberra: What Lessons Can be
Learned?, 21 LAND USE POL’Y 45 (2004). In 2005, the Israeli Cabinet approved the
recommendations of a public committee to transfer full ownership in urban lands to
the lessees for an additional, relatively small payment. See Tzally Greenberg, PM
Okays Reform to Public Real Estate Sector, HAARETZ.COM (Eng. ed.), May 17, 2005.
151
Kibbutzim that were set up prior to 1948 had originally signed collective leases
with JNF for a period of 49 years.
GIDEON VITKON, ISRAEL LANDS
ADMINSITRATION LAW 919–26 (2004) (Hebrew). After the establishment of the
State of Israel and the formation of ILA, the Kibbutzim entered collective short-term
agreements with ILA. Id. at 927–35 Those agreements are either bilateral, in which
the Kibbutz is the lessee, or trilateral, in which the Jewish Agency (a nongovernmental development agency established in 1929) is the lessee, and the Kibbutz is the
holder of merely a permit to occupy and use the land for agriculture. Id. at 971–95
Under each scenario, the individual Kibbutz members had no formal rights in the
land. Id. at 1129–31
152
Israel Lands Council, Decision No. 751 (Feb. 27, 1996), available at http://
www.mmi.gov.il (Hebrew).
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ply too high for most Kibbutzim members. In 2005, the Cabinet approved the recommendations of yet another public committee ap153
pointed to review the issue. According to the new policy—recently
implemented through corresponding decisions by the ILA—each
family would be allocated one housing unit for a capitalization fee of
154
3.75 percent of the tract’s market value.
As far as the internal regime is concerned, the Renewing Kibbutz
may allocate the housing units based on “egalitarian criterions, con155
sidering the member’s seniority.” To preserve its revised version of
communitarianism and group solidarity, the Renewing Kibbutz is required to set-up direct restraints on further alienation of the housing
units. This means that the Renewing Kibbutz must make a provision
in its by-laws for housing units to be transferred only to members in
the Kibbutz’s cooperative association, or at the least, that at any given
point in time, more than half of the housing units in the Kibbutz will
156
belong to such full-fledged members.
Moreover, in the event of
such transfer, the Kibbutz itself has a right of first refusal to purchase
157
the housing unit at its market price.
Third, the Renewing Kibbutz is entitled to allocate individual
shares in the Kibbutz’s productive assets, provided that the individual
members will not be able to jointly gain corporate control of any specific enterprise (meaning, typically, that the Kibbutz will retain more
158
than fifty percent of the shares).
The allocation of shares will be
153

See Report of the Committee for the Review of Rights in Residential Areas in
Agricultural Settlements (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.mof.gov.il/karka200512.htm (Hebrew).
154
Israel Lands Council, Decision No. 979 (Mar. 27, 2007); Israel Lands Council,
Decision No. 1101 (Mar. 27, 2007). However, should the family wish to receive the
full development rights (current and future) for the tract, it would have to pay an
additional sum to ILA, equal to 29.25% of the land’s full market value. Israel Lands
Council, Decision No. 979 §§ 4.7–4.8. This new policy is a source of public controversy, with some advocacy groups protesting what they deem to be an undeserved
governmental giving of state-owned lands (one of which submitted a petition to the
Supreme Court of Israel in the matter in July 2007), and Kibbutzim and Moshavim
on their part disputing the additional 29.25% payment. Amiram Cohen & Anat
Georgy, ILA Reinstates Land Discount for Kibbutz, Moshav Veterans, HAARETZ.COM (Eng.
ed.), Jan. 12, 2006.
155
Cooperative Associations Ordinances (Affiliation of Housing Units in a Renewing Kibbutz), § 3, 2005, KT 6445, 195.
156
The residents who are not Kibbutz members must become members in a
broader-based “cooperative association for community settlement” with its own
screening process. Id. §§ 6–8.
157
Id. § 9.
158
Cooperative Associations Ordinances (Affiliation of Productive Assets in a Renewing Kibbutz), 2005, KT 6445, 195. The ordinances refer to the definition of the
term “control” in Securities Law, § 1, 1968, S.H. 541, 234, which creates a presump-
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made by applying “egalitarian criterions and in equal manner, con159
sidering the member’s seniority.” The Kibbutz may also set caps on
the overall holding of individual members following subsequent
transfers, as well as a right of first refusal in favor of the Kibbutz in
160
case of such transfer.
The Renewing Kibbutz faces considerable challenges in its transition from a regime of comprehensive communitarianism and egalitarianism into a structure driven by a mixed ideology, and translated
into a mixed property arrangement.
To compare, in CICs, group ownership and governance of private
property is a mere instrumentality based on the insights that there
are diverging optimal scales governing different assets and uses in a
161
residential neighborhood, and that the value and enjoyment of private assets is largely influenced by a complicated web of neighborhood-level concerns including group composition, intraneighborhood externalities, and other types of collective action dilemmas. In this respect, CICs have been able to reach a stable equilibrium in designing the property mix, even if at the risk of occasional rigidity. In contrast, in the Renewing Kibbutz, group control is
still a constitutive intrinsic value, even in its moderate current version.
The attempt to combine an incentive structure for individual productivity alongside substantial levels of egalitarianism, communality, and
a core of collective ownership as a built-in constraint per se has yet to
be attained. This is mainly because one of the linchpins of the cooperative Kibbutz, namely, the assumption that collectivism need not
necessarily come at the expense of efficiency and productivity, may
have been valid for an agriculture-based society that was able to shut
itself off from external pressures, but has been largely undermined
with the changes in endogenous and exogenous circumstances. 162
Moreover, the on-going commitment to collectivism, which applies to all aspects of life, including the household management, diftion of control in a corporation when a stakeholder has more than fifty percent of
the voting rights or has the power to appoint more than fifty percent of the board’s
directors.
159
Cooperative Associations Ordinances (Affiliation of Productive Assets in a Renewing Kibbutz), 2005, KT 6445, 195.
160
Id. at 6.
161
See infra notes 337–39 and accompanying text.
162
As Robert Ellickson predicts, in order to survive, a commune “must maintain
homogeneity of interests, establish systematic internal social controls, and stem exodus by controlling information about the outside world and penalizing those who
leave.” Ellickson, supra note 25, at 1361. With the decay of such elements in the
Kibbutz, came also a decline in productivity because of internal free-riding and a
“brain drain” of productive members. See CRISIS, supra note 136, at 160–61.
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ferentiates the Renewing Kibbutz from yet other types of regimes of
common property, such as traditional forms of group management of
natural resources, which are largely driven by considerations of opti163
mal scale and other instrumental benefits. Thus, while the process
of change seems to abide by Demsetz’s evolutionary theory of property, it remains to be seen whether the Renewing Kibbutz would be
able to contest Demsetz’s normative bias in favor of private prop164
erty, and to position itself in a stable, distinctive point along the private-common continuum, delineated as follows:
Private

private property + standard public
regulation

Common

commercial
corporations

Common Interest Communities

traditional common property
regimes (fisheries, etc.)

Renewing
Kibbutz

cooperative
Kibbutz /
religious
communes

Chart 2
The Private-Common Continuum

IV. PUBLIC-COMMON PROPERTY
Beyond the Public-Private Partnerships discussed in Part II, the
shift in the reality of public provision of goods and services takes
place in many other ways, both formal and informal. These various
forms have received scant academic attention, with little attempt to
conceptualize them and to place them within the broader framework
165
of property regimes.
In this part, I analyze mixed-in-fact property
regimes, which I entitle “public commons,” following an examination
of urban local public spaces, such as parks, playgrounds, and squares,
the production and management of which combine elements of both

163

See OSTROM, supra note 1, at 58–181 (offering a comprehensive analysis of such
actual regimes).
164
See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
165
There are a few exceptions to this, although in most cases the analysis of such
property forms as hybrids is quite implicit. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 4, at 126–28
(discussing a quasi-governmental organization called English Nature, which created
a kind of commons to protect the chalk cliff and seashore area of England’s Thanet
Coast in accordance with the European Union legal requirements and British domestic policy); OSTROM, supra note 1, at 90, 101–02 (discussing “nested enterprises”
in which local commons may be nested within larger governmental systems).
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166

“public” and “common.”
Although the various “public commons”
along the spectrum—which I will delineate in the context of public
spaces in New York City—diverge from one another in their unique
mixtures of “public” and “common” elements, they do share broader
167
conceptual and normative aspects.
Whereas the public spaces surveyed are formally owned by the
government (usually a city), many are allocated and are regularly operated and maintained in contextual, complicated manners. Of specific interest are the various forms of involvement of the local group
of users, which is typically comprised of geographically adjacent residents or businesses. In some cases, the local group of users is formally organized and is a counterpart to an explicit role allocation visà-vis the government. In other cases, the local involvement is largely
informal yet may be persistent and highly significant in the on-going
life of the public space. 168
This phenomenon is far from being anecdotal both in terms of its
scope and of its implications. The level and nature of local involvement may in many cases determine the fate of the resource. Longenduring cooperation between local users and between the group
and the government is often essential to making a publicly-owned
space successful, endowing significant direct benefits and positive
spillovers. On the contrary, under-investment and neglect by the local users may have the opposite effect of securing resources with net
negative value.
166

In an earlier work, I identified and analyzed a phenomenon of grassroots, local
group cooperation that has brought back many public spaces throughout the country from being sites of dereliction, neglect, and crime into centers of thriving local
activity and a source of pride for residents. Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local
Public Goods: Toward a Better Future for Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAW. 1 (2004)
[hereinafter Lehavi, Property Rights]. I focused mainly on informal patterns of such
activities that have often been able to grow and stabilize over time, and I pointed to
the promises and challenges of this phenomenon. See generally id. In this Article, I
extend this discussion to offer a fuller taxonomy of the range of formal and informal
“public commons.”
167
Although I focus on the urban setting, such phenomena exist also in suburban
and rural areas. See, e.g., BRIAN DONAHUE, RECLAIMING THE COMMONS: COMMUNITY
FARMS AND FORESTS IN A NEW ENGLAND TOWN (1999) (describing the establishment of
a non-profit community-based farm on town-owned land in Weston, Massachusetts,
devoted to environmental and social goals).
168
The reality of “public commons” exceeds public spaces. One better-known example is the Community Development Corporation (CDC). CDCs are multi-purpose
community-controlled corporations that work to develop and improve an area
through provision of affordable housing, social services, job training, etc. See PAUL S.
GROGAN & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD
REVIVAL 65–101 (2000); AVIS C. VIDAL, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES: A NATIONAL STUDY
OF URBAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 33–84 (1992).
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This mixed socio-economic reality is not, however, accompanied
by an adequate legal regime that looks beyond the formal ownership
of the government. Specifically, in cases involving explicit cooperation, the interests of the local group may be protected by contract,
whereas more informal patterns of group management do not enjoy
legal validation corresponding to the parties’ actual form of engagement in the resource. In such cases, the community has to rely on
more general doctrines, such as the law of dedication or the public
trust doctrine, which at times may under-protect the group, and at
other times may over-protect it. This state of affairs stresses the need
for an updated legal regime that would fully consider the current
landscape of public-common mixtures and would provide the proper
incentives for successful resource provision and management. Such a
regime would, in appropriate cases, validate what are currently informal types of “public commons.”
A. The “Public” in Local Public Spaces
As discussed in the context of CICs, local public goods that do not
possess pure public good traits—meaning that they are subject to
problems of congestion and rising marginal costs from a given number of users, and that non-members can be effectively excluded from
169
them—may be generally produced by private firms or institutions.
This group of club goods also consists of spaces and amenities such as
parks, playgrounds, squares, and sport facilities, which are regularly
produced not only in planned communities, but also in ordinary urban settings. Private clubs provide sport facilities (gyms, swimming
pools, etc.), whereas shopping malls typically include wide spaces,
green areas, and play areas.
Governmentally owned public spaces still comprise, however, a
major part of such spaces in cities. New York City has over 1,700 pub170
lic spaces and recreational facilities.
Other major cities also typi171
cally own hundreds of such amenities.
This is not due merely to
the history of government default provision in the pre-CIC or preshopping-mall era. Today, cities continue to establish new public
spaces, even when they are subject to budgetary constraints, and of172
ten subsequently fail to properly maintain them. In an era of priva169

See supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.
See New York City Department of Parks and Recreation Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nycgovparks.org/sub_faqs/park_faqs.html#g1 (last visited Feb. 1,
2007).
171
See Lehavi, Property Rights, supra note 166, at 29–30 (setting forth representative
figures).
172
Id. at 31–33.
170
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tization of the public realm, there still exist several reasons for maintaining a substantial public property layer in such resources.
1.

Positive Externalities

One justification for governmental provision of public spaces
concerns non-use values and other types of positive externalities.
Public spaces provide direct benefits for people who visit and use
them, such as enjoyment of recreational activities, improved personal
173
health, and child skill development.
A private supplier can internalize benefits that it provides to users by charging membership or
174
user fees.
However, successful public spaces may often entail significant advantages for residents who do not actively use them. Positive spillover effects stemming from a public space typically include
175
an increase in adjacent real estate prices and a boost to economic
176
and commercial activity.
Here, the private provider has no apparent mechanism to collect on these benefits. Courts generally have
been reluctant to hold a neighbor liable in restitution following a selfserving activity by a landowner that incidentally improves the
neighbor’s land, even when the benefit is readily translatable to
177
monetary gain.
Transaction and strategic costs may also hamper
the possibility of a comprehensive, contractually-based contribution
by neighboring beneficiaries, leading again to the fear of sub-optimal
173

See SUSAN G. SOLOMON, AMERICAN PLAYGROUNDS: REVITALIZING COMMUNITY
SPACE 209–11 (2005) (discussing the benefits of playgrounds, promoting child development and health); Lawrence D. Frank & Peter Engelke, How Land Use and Transportation Systems Impact Public Health (ACES: Active Community Environment Initiative Working Paper No. 1) 12–13, 37–40, available at http://www.cdc.gov
/nccdphp/dnpa/pdf/aces-workingpaper1.pdf (last viewed on Feb. 1, 2007) (discussing the links between public health, physical activity, and urban space design).
174
Numerous methods have been offered to measure the private demand for resources such as public spaces. See, e.g., ROBERT C. MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON,
USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 78–79
(1989).
175
There is a host of empirical evidence indicating a positive link between successful (i.e., safe, well-maintained) urban public parks and other open spaces and
adjacent real estate prices. See, e.g., Molly Epsey & Kwame Owuso-Edusei, Neighborhood Parks and Residential Property Values in Greenville, South Carolina, 33 J. AGRIC. &
APPLIED ECON. 487 (2001); D.W. Hobden et al., Green Space Borders—A Tangible Benefit? Evidence from Four Neighborhoods in Surrey, British Columbia, 1980–2001, 21 LAND USE
POL’Y 129 (2004); Vicki Been & Ioan Voicu, The Effect of Community Gardens on
Neighboring Property Values (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 46, Mar. 2006),
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/46.
176
The Trust for Public Land, Benefits of Urban Open Space, http://www.tpl.org
/tier3_cdl.cfm?content_item_id=1242&folder_id=905 (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
177
See, e.g., Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 15 A. 65 (Me. 1888); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. e, illus. 4 (Discussion Draft
2000).
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provision when the provider’s use-based revenues are insufficient.
Contrarily, a local government whose public spaces confer such derivative benefits could capture a portion of them through increased
revenues from property taxes, taxes related to economic activity (such
as sales taxes), or by initially imposing project-specific special assess178
ments on neighboring properties.
In a few cases, the very existence of a certain public space that is
located in a unique natural surrounding or that has an outstanding
aesthetic or historical value may provide additional forms of non-use
values that affect much larger, dispersed communities. 179 Put differently, such non-use benefits constitute public goods that may necessitate some type of pubic intervention to improve the chances for an
efficient level of provision.
2.

Egalitarianism

A second argument in favor of governmental provision of public
spaces is the promotion of equity between citizens of different socioeconomic classes. Nineteenth century-based urban parks—Frederic
Law Olmsted’s Central Park being a notable example—were intended to serve as a melting pot for different classes of people that
lived in close proximity and as an arena for socializing poor immi180
grants into the values of the gentry.
Somewhat differently, public
spaces (playgrounds in particular) designed during the Reform Era
were a form of social control aimed at developing a specific set of
181
values in the poor and immigrant urban residents.
Despite the
182
decay of such indoctrination and paternalism over time, public
parks seem to continue to be generally viewed as an appropriate
object of “specific egalitarianism”—the provision of a baseline level of
benefits that every individual should enjoy as a matter of social
183
policy.
178

Interestingly, when the derivative benefits of the public space expand beyond
municipal borders, and in the absence of an intergovernmental contribution
mechanism, the fear of sub-optimal provision could re-emerge. See Amnon Lehavi,
Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 VA. L. REV. 929, 984–87 (2006).
179
See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The “Conservation Game”: The Possibility of Voluntary Cooperation in Preserving Buildings of Cultural Importance, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
733, 747–49 (1997) (offering a taxonomy of such non-use values).
180
FREDERIC LAW OLMSTED, PUBLIC PARKS AND THE ENLARGEMENT OF TOWNS (1870),
reprinted in THE CITY READER 302, 306–07 (Richard L. Gates & Frederic Stout eds., 3d
ed. 2003).
181
GALEN CRANZ, THE POLITICS OF PARK DESIGN: A HISTORY OF URBAN PARKS IN
AMERICA 61–84 (1982).
182
Id. at 101.
183
James Tobin, On Limiting the Domain of Inequality, 13 J.L. & ECON. 263, 264
(1970).
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Although egalitarianism could theoretically be achieved by means
that avoid governmental ownership, such as by subsidies or incentives
184
to private suppliers, empirical evidence points to very limited success. One example is New York City’s “privately owned public
spaces,” amenities for the public required from a developer in return
185
for other zoning variances, such as floor area ratio bonuses.
Because these spaces must maintain an “essential nexus” that physically
186
connects them with the particular commercial development, they
are densely concentrated in commercial hubs, while almost nonexistent in other areas. Accordingly, out of the 503 privately owned
public spaces, 496 are located in Manhattan and only seven in the
187
other four boroughs.
This is definitely not to say that governmental provision of public
spaces adequately achieves the goal of social egalitarianism. Anecdotal evidence indicates that municipal public parks are predominately
188
developed in white, affluent neighborhoods. Formal public ownership of public spaces does, however, maintain at least the possibility
of public law accountability, including equal protection litigation,
189
even though its success has been modest in this context.
3.

Publicness and Democracy

A related argument in favor of governmental ownership concerns
publicness and democracy. Utilization of public spaces as centers for
urban public life in Western culture dates back at least to the times of
184

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 87 (6th ed. 2003).
The 1961 Zoning Resolution in New York City, which regulates the provision of
privately owned public spaces, explicitly requires that these spaces be kept open to
the public. JEROLD S. KAYDEN ET AL., PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE: THE NEW YORK
CITY EXPERIENCE 38 (2000).
186
Cf. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987) (requiring
such mandated contribution to the public be “reasonably related to the public need
or burden that the [project] creates or to which it contributes.”).
187
KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 185, at 297.
188
Michael Gelboter, The Meaning of Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 841, 853–54 (1994); Jane E. Schukoske, Community Development Through Gardening: State and Local Policies Transforming Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 351, 357–59 (2000).
189
See supra note 82 (discussing equal protection litigation on municipal services
in general). In Beal v. Lindsay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit denied relief to black and Puerto Rican residents living in the neighborhood
of Crotona Park who alleged that New York City had unconstitutionally discriminated
against them by failing to maintain the Park in a condition equivalent to that of
other parks in the Bronx. 468 F.2d 287, 288–89, 290–91 (2d Cir. 1972). The court
found that “the City ha[d] satisfied its constitutional obligations by equal input even
though, because of conditions for which it is not responsible [e.g., vandalism], it
ha[d] not achieved the equal results it desire[d].” Id. at 290–91.
185
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190

the Greek Agora and the Roman Forum. These centers served as a
meeting place for citizens, in which they handled their common
affairs, traded goods, enjoyed dances and games, and exchanged
191
news and opinions. In the New World, settlements and towns were
192
designed around a central public square. In the English Northeast
towns, the central Common served governmental functions alongside
public life functions, (for example, providing a place to conduct
militia drills as well as allowing for the citizenry to assemble), as well
193
as private functions, such as the grazing of cattle.
Even with the
changes in the conceptualization and design of public spaces during
194
later times, these resources maintained their basic characters not
only as places designated to host the diverse general public, but also
195
as forums for embedding civic-democratic functions and values.
A legal manifestation of the vision of public spaces as promoting
notions of publicness and democracy is found in the “public forum”
doctrine, conceived of in the context of the First Amendment Free
196
Speech Clause.
Within the delineation of the various types of public properties for the purpose of reviewing the constitutionality of restrictions imposed on individual and group expressive activities, public spaces such as parks and streets are considered the most
quintessential public fora that “have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
197
discussing public questions.”

190

LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS TRANSFORMATION, AND
ITS PROSPECTS 149 (1961).
191
Id. at 149–50.
192
This was also the case with towns established by the Spaniards, in which the
main plaza was used as a marketplace as well as for other purposes such as celebrations, tournaments and bullfights. JOHN W. REPS, THE MAKING OF URBAN AMERICA 29–
30 (1965); MARK GIROUARD, CITIES AND PEOPLE: A SOCIAL AND ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY
233–36 (1985).
193
While in most cities, such as New Haven, Connecticut and Boston, Massachusetts, the Common was designed as a central square, in others, such as in Sharon,
Connecticut, the Common was actually a 150 to 200-foot wide strip running through
the entire length of the town. MUMFORD, supra note 190, at 133.
194
See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text; CRANZ, supra note 181 (offering
a comprehensive review of the different phases of American public parks).
195
FRUG, supra note 54, at 60–61.
196
U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2.
197
See Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)); Horton v. City of St. Augustine,
272 F.3d 1318, 1333–35 (11th Cir. 2001) (offering a recent analysis of the “public forum” spectrum).
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Two interrelated developments seem, however, to undermine the
practical ability of governmentally-owned public spaces to promote
the values of publicness and democracy, but at the same time stress
the inherent problems with private alternatives. On the one hand,
many traditional centers and other public spaces in cities have been
gradually appropriated by drug dealers, homeless people and so
forth, driving away other citizens. This trend has been exacerbated
by judicial prohibitions of certain types of law and order measures
such as anti-loitering legislation, which is considered to unduly limit
civil liberties. 198 On the other hand, the “legitimate” public has found
shopping malls and other privately-owned spaces as places where sociability, civility, and commerce can once again flourish in an atmos199
phere of safety and security.
To achieve that purpose, these privately owned spaces exercise different forms of formal and informal
200
regulation on functions, activities, and admittance.
Although
201
courts have intervened in some cases of exclusionary regulation,
202
most types of such regulation seem to remain intact.
These two trends have been portrayed as creating a divide be203
tween the concepts of “community” and “public.”
Whereas the latter notion entails confrontation with difference, heterogeneity, and
randomness, “community” emphasizes familiarity, security, control,
204
and a conformist identity that smoothes over differences.
Consequently, “community” emphasizes exclusion of those who simply do
205
not “fit in.”
Hence, to the extent that one views at least some de198

See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45–46, 64 (1991) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a city ordinance barring “criminal street gang members from loitering with one another or with other persons” in public spaces). There is considerable debate among property scholars about public space law and order programs.
Compare Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996), with Richard C.
Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371 (2001), and Nicole Stelle
Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075 (2005).
199
See Lynn A. Staeheli & Don Mitchell, USA’s Destiny? Regulating Space and Creating Community in American Shopping Malls, 43 URB. STUD. 977, 977–98 (2006).
200
Id. at 982–89.
201
In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, the Supreme Court’s most recent case
on the quasi-public nature of private shopping malls, the Court denied a federal constitutional right of free speech to hand out political pamphlets in the mall’s common
areas. 447 U.S. 74, 80–81 (1980). However, the Court upheld a provision of the California State Constitution protecting such activities and rejected the mall owner’s argument that this violated his First Amendment rights. Id. at 88.
202
MARGARET KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC
SPACE 9–10, 191–93 (2004).
203
Id. at 74–78.
204
Id. at 193–94.
205
Staeheli & Mitchell, supra note 199, at 978.
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gree of publicness, pluralism, and promotion of democratic debate
206
and discourse in public forums as socially desirable, purely private
207
spaces will usually not suffice.
Accordingly, the true challenge in attempting to revive governmentally-owned public spaces is to make them thriving and vibrant
again, but without simultaneously mimicking the constraining practices of private spaces. This requires governments and groups to
work together to create a new type of public space management—
one that works to increase the stakeholding of local groups and utilizes their special affinity for the resource, while, at a minimum, ensuring at least a certain level of genuine publicness and broader democratic values.
B. “Public Commons” in Public Spaces
This Section offers a concise description of different types of actual mixed public spaces in New York City, providing a substantive
framework within which the following sections will analyze the three
main challenges that apply to all types of spaces along the publiccommon continuum: (1) identifying the bilateral incentives of the
relevant parties, (i.e. the government and the local groups); (2) addressing the possible tensions between the “public” and the “common” elements, and exposing informal or voluntary mechanisms that
can be employed to resolve such tensions, thus preventing an explicit
legal conflict; and (3) revealing why current law is unsatisfying in
dealing with the complexities of public commons and developing
ways to reshape it to better promote the socially desirable policy.
New York City’s total acreage of public open space (38,147) is the
largest in the U.S. among high-population-density cities, both in abso208
lute area and as a percentage of total city acreage (19.7%).
Over
29,000 acres are devoted to the 1770 city-owned parks, around 220 of

206

KOHN, supra note 202, at 198–205; Staeheli & Mitchell, supra note 199, at 989;
DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC
SPACE 130–52 (2003).
207
See Elizabeth Blackmar, Appropriating “the Commons”: The Tragedy of Property
Rights Discourse, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE 49, 49–50 (Setha Low & Neil Smith
eds., 2006) (arguing that the current proliferation of commercial centers and residential subdivisions that include the term “commons” in their names alludes to the
romantic concept of Commons in New England towns, but that these spaces are void
of genuine values and practices of public discourse).
208
The Trust for Public Lands, Total Parkland as Percent of City Land Area FY
2006, http://www.tpl.org/content_documents/ccpe_TotalAcres_asPercentofLandAr
ea.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
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which are defined by the City as “large parks.” The remaining 1550
parks are further broken down into 360 small parks (sitting areas/triangles/malls), ninety neighborhood parks, 960 playgrounds,
210
and forty undeveloped sites serving effectively as small parks.
According to Partnerships for Parks, a joint program of the NYC Parks
& Recreation Department and the non-profit City Parks Foundation,
there are over 3800 grassroots, community-based organizations
throughout the City, of which about 2700 are chiefly dedicated to
211
parks.
Overall, such “friends of” groups are active in over half of
212
the City’s parks. The nature and size of these groups considerably
diverge between the different parks. In the following sub-sections, I
offer a rough, non-exhaustive taxonomy of the various types of local
group involvement in NYC’s parks, starting with more informal patterns and moving up to more full-fledged types of public commons.
1.

Informal User Groups: McCarren Park Moms

Close to the “public” end of the public-common continuum, one
finds informal and non-institutionalized “friends of” groups working
to improve and steward “their” local park. An example is the Park
Moms group involved in the Vincent V. Abate playground, located
213
within McCarren Park in Brooklyn.
The informal Park Moms group was initiated in 1996 by Susie
Monagan, who was motivated into action when her child demanded
214
outdoor playing space.
At the time, the playground was badly neglected; most swings were missing, and the garden was weeded

209

Interview with Mr. Jack T. Linn, Assistant Comm’r, and with Mr. Warner Johnston, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, City of New York Parks & Recreation Dep’t (Apr. 23, 2007).
210
E-mail from Dana Rubinstein, Deputy Director, Office of Public Recreation,
NYC Parks & Recreation, to author (Jan. 10, 2006) (on file with author). In addition,
there are about 2,100 “Greenstreets”—concrete triangles and traffic islands converted by the City into green spots. Id.
211
Interview with Mr. Jason Schwartz, Dir., and with Ms. Emily Maxwell, Acting
Dir., Catalyst Program, Partnerships for Parks (Apr. 24, 2007). Partnerships for Parks
provides various services to such groups, including volunteer and permit coordination, technical assistance, outreach activities, and catalyst programs aimed at mobilizing grassroots “social capital.” Id.
212
Id. The difference between the number of groups and that of communityactive parks derives from the fact that in many cases, there are multiple groups working in the same park. For example, there are around thirty groups involved with the
Flushing Meadows Park in Queens. Id.
213
See Lehavi, Property Rights, supra note 166, at 35–37 (describing in more detail
the group’s activity in 1996–2003); Telephone Interview with Katherine Naplatarski
(Mar. 1, 2006) (updating information after the publication of Lehavi, Property Rights).
214
Id.
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215

over.
Monagan started to establish an informal network of
neighbors, most of them young parents who lacked sufficient home
216
playing space.
This informal process was carried out through telephone calls, notices posted on-site, and, at a later stage, through a
217
newsletter and an e-mail list.
Because Park Moms is an informal group, it acted from the outset
(and still does today) through the City Parks Foundation as a fiscal
218
agent.
The group’s annual “budget,” which is currently around
$7,000, comes chiefly from the local city councilmember’s office, with
smaller amounts coming from local businesses and other private do219
nors. The group’s political clout has shown itself to be useful from
early on, when in 1999 the group successfully lobbied the councilmember to have a sprinkler pool built next to the playground at a
220
cost of about $600,000.
Although Park Moms does not have regular meetings, and the
communication is casual in nature, one can always expect a “critical
221
mass” of neighbors to show up for a given project. These dynamics
may also help to explain the group’s decision-making process. Although there are neither official managers nor a formal voting system, the initiator of a certain project will often gain consensus for her
222
proposed action.
Apparently, in such an informal setting, consensus seems necessary to maintain the atmosphere of good will contribution.
Interestingly, the group did not fall apart when Monagan moved
223
outside the City. The current core of the group consists of four activists who meet every few months, with approximately 20--250 locals
224
participating in the various activities. Although the group does not
currently apply for special grants and no longer maintains a newsletter, it continues to hold regular activities throughout the year, including a spring concert series, cleanup events, tree-planting, outreach
215

Id.
Id.
217
As of November 2000, Susie had a mailing list of 300 people for the Park
Moms’ Newsletter and forty to fifty addressees on her regular hardcopy mailing list.
Id.
218
Id.
219
One donation came from the Exxon Mobil Foundation to finance the bush
plantings project, serving probably as an informal measure of compensation for pollution from its nearby factory. See supra note 209.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id.
216
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activities with local schools, and a current campaign to have an ice225
skating rink installed nearby.
The group continues to collaborate
with other groups in McCarren Park, and is accordingly part of an in226
formal thread created between different groups of users.
In sum, although the McCarren Park Moms has stuck to its informal character, and its activities are not anchored in formal agreements with the City’s Parks Department, it continues to be a significant force in the ongoing management and improvement of the
playground, to have considerable political clout, and to generally
maintain harmonious relations with the City and with other user
groups.
2.

Incorporated User Groups: The Carl Schurz Park
Association

The Carl Schurz Park Association prides itself on being the “old227
est community-based volunteer park association” in New York City.
In the late 1960s, a small group of parents joined forces to help up228
grade Carl Schurz Park, located in Manhattan’s Upper East Side.
Though it had initially focused on the playground, after the City’s
major fiscal crisis in the 1970s which threatened the viability of the
entire City and of its open spaces in particular, the group was spurred
to broaden its commitment and to take an increasingly active role in
229
maintaining and improving the entire park.
The Association incorporated in 1974 as a tax-exempt non-profit organization with volunteer directors and officers, and it enjoys pro bono legal counsel230
ing.
Its first major restoration project, the replacement of cherry
trees that died from a faulty drainage system, came in 1976 and was
considered a precedent in the sense that the community group had
financed the installation of the trees and sod and provided the drainage pipes in the city-owned park while the Parks Department pro231
vided the labor.
Since then, the Association grew in numbers and in its scope of
232
action.
It currently has 1,200 active dues-paying members and en225

See supra note 209.
Id.
227
See Carl Schurz Park Association, http://www.carlschurzparknyc.org/index.
html (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
228
See A Brief History of Carl Schurz Park Association, http://www.carlschurz
parknyc.org/history.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
226
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gages in multiple activities, including the purchase of plants and gardening supplies; the renovation of dog-runs; the provision of supplies
and special programs for kids; and financial and logistic support for
annual community events such as art shows, summer concerts, and
233
holiday festivals.
Until recently, the Association also funded the
cost of a full-time workfare supervisor, a portion of a year-round gardener’s salary, and the Association is currently in negotiations with
the Park’s Department to fund half the salary of a park enforcement
234
officer.
Despite playing an essential role in the maintenance and management of the Park for some time, only recently did the Association
start negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with the Parks
235
Department to formalize the relationship.
Until now, it has been
the informal ability of the Association to navigate matters vis-à-vis the
Parks Department, the police, and elected city and state officials that
has led the Association to a successful record of goal accomplishment, whether this was facilitated by public funding or by the Association’s own funds, which come primarily from donations, member
236
fees, government grants, and program services.
The Carl Schurz Park Association presents, therefore, a vivid example of both the potential in ongoing grassroots coordination between the Park’s local users, and of the severe governmental constraints that may often necessitate the transition to hybrid forms of
management and finance in many publicly owned spaces to prevent
237
their deterioration and dereliction.
3.

Formal Mixed Management: Prospect Park Alliance
and ComCom

In a number of parks, New York City has entered into formal cooperation arrangements with non-profit corporations for the full or
partial management, maintenance, and improvement of the publicly238
owned park.
Probably the best known example is the Central Park
233

Id.
E-mail from David Williams, President, Carl Schurz Park Assoc., to author
(Mar. 7, 2006) (on file with author).
235
Id.
236
In the fiscal year 2003, the Association had overall revenue of $163,879. See
supra note 227.
237
See Toni Whitt, Civic Pride and Volunteerism Bring Allure Back to Riverside Park,
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at B4 (telling the similar story of Upper Manhattan’s Riverside Park).
238
Besides Central Park, Prospect Park, and Bryant Park, which will be discussed
separately in sub-sections (3) and (4), similar arrangements exist in Battery Park and
in Randall’s and Ward’s Island Parks in Manhattan; in the Bronx River Park in the
234

LEHAVI_FINAL

186

1/11/2008 1:59:14 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:137

Conservancy, a non-profit organization established in 1980, which has
been awarded renewing management agreements to “ensure[] the
continuing maintenance, public programming, and capital restora239
tion of Central Park.” While these instances of formal partnerships
between the city and non-profit organizations may be seen as just another example of Public-Private Partnerships discussed previously, the
various park partnerships do seem to possess additional traits that
emphasize the role of the local community both in the structure of
the non-profit organization and in its relations with the park users,
hence constituting a distinctive type of “public commons.”
240
An interesting example is Prospect Park in Brooklyn. The Park,
which serves over six million visitors a year, is managed by the collaboration of the Parks Department and the Prospect Park Alliance, a
241
non-profit established in 1987.
Whereas the Prospect Park Alliance’s regular operating budget is about $5 million (coming chiefly
from private and government support, and the rest from fees and
other user-based revenues), in 2005 the Alliance completed an unprecedented $116 million campaign for capital improvements in the
242
Park.
The Park has over 5000 volunteers, some of them individuals and
groups who feel a special affinity to the Park, and others who are part
of organized programs of schools, religious institutions, corporations,

Bronx; and in the Greenbelt Park in Staten Island. E-mail from Dana Rubinstein,
supra note 210. According to city officials, there are around twenty five undeveloped
(i.e., largely natural) parks in New York City that have regional appeal and can draw
sufficient funds through concessions or private donations, so as to make them candidates for innovative management schemes. Interview with Linn & Johnston, supra
note 209.
239
On April 27, 2006, the contract was renewed until 2014. See The Central Park
Conservancy, http://www.centralparknyc.org/abooutcpc/partnership (last visited
Feb. 1, 2007).
240
The data in the following paragraphs is based primarily on a series of interviews I held between 2000 and 2005 with the following Prospect Park Alliance employees: Rachel Amar, Carol Anastasio, Carol Ann-Church, Danny Cunningham, Pam
Fishman, and Dawn Torres; and on interviews with several group members who attended a ComCom meeting in Prospect Park on Nov. 30, 2000.
241
Although there is no formal agreement between the entities about the overall
management of the Park, the relationships are recognized and validated, inter alia,
in the Alliance’s structure. See supra note 240. Tupper Thomas, the President of the
Alliance, is an employee of the City’s Parks Department, and was originally hired as
the Park’s first administrator in 1980 by then Parks Commissioner Gordon Davis. Id.
In addition, the Alliance’s board includes ex officio the Parks Commissioner, the
Brooklyn Borough President, and local city councilmembers, alongside members
from the private sector. Id.
242
Prospect Park Alliance, Annual Report 2005, at 2, 6–7, available at http://www.
prospectpark.org/general/annual_reports/PPA2005Annual.pdf.
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243

mandated community service, etc.
In addition, in 1995, the Prospect Park Alliance formed the Community Committee (informally
known as ComCom), aimed at serving “as a conduit for information
244
and feedback.” ComCom includes over eighty groups of park users
and other interest holders (such as local businesses and elected officials), with representatives of about thirty to forty of these groups
regularly participating in ComCom’s meetings, which are held about
245
six times a year.
These meetings are intended primarily to inform
246
and advise the groups of future plans and projects.
Besides meetings of general interest, the Alliance also maintains frameworks for
community dialogue regarding distinctive portions of the Park. For
example, the General Playground Committee meets four times a year
to discuss issues pertaining to the seven playgrounds located throughout the Park, with meetings between the Alliance and a certain indi247
vidual playground group held on an ad hoc basis.
As for the forces driving individuals with a shared specific interest
in the Park to organize into a group, it should be noted that some
groups, such as the Prospect Park Running Club, were already organ248
ized before the establishment of ComCom.
Other user groups
evolved spontaneously, usually following conflicts about their specific
249
uses.
For example, following recurring complaints about dogs digging holes causing people to trip, the Park’s management handed
out leaflets to dog owners and summoned them to an open meet250
ing.
The result was the establishment of FIDO, an interest group
251
representing dog owners in the Park.
Although ComCom is not intended to be a forum for dispute
resolution among different types of users, its structure has often
proved efficient in facilitating informal dialogue among groups dur252
ing conflicts, although it is the Alliance, which, together with the
city, has the formal power of resolution over the rules of use in the
253
Park. One example of an unresolved conflict is between FIDO and
243

See supra note 240.
Prospect Park Alliance, PROSPECT PARK NEWS, Dec. 1999–Feb. 2000, at 3 (on file
with author).
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
See supra note 240.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
See Prospect Park—Overview, http://www.prospectpark.org/general/main.cfm
?target=home.
244
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the Brooklyn Bird Club, a group of bird watchers, following the lat254
ter’s recurring complaints of dogs scaring away the birds.
In other
cases, however, the inter-group dialogue has facilitated efficient use
arrangements in the Park, as was the case with the creation of differ255
ent lanes for bikers and runners. In this respect also, the ComCom
framework proves to be an overall successful conduit for information
and coordination both between the Alliance and the groups, and
256
among the different user groups themselves.
4.

Formal Sub-Local Structures: Bryant Park and BIDs

Beyond ad hoc partnerships between governments and private
non-profits, cities have been experimenting with formal sub-local
257
structures, which combine private, public, and common elements.
Of particular interest here are Business Improvement Districts
(BIDs), which establish a territorial subdivision of a city in which
businesses and residential property owners are subject to additional
district-specific taxes reserved to funding services and improvements
258
within the district.
BIDs have proven to be generally efficient in
both the establishment and the maintenance of amenities at the sub259
260
local level.
While a BID does have some public characteristics,
the members of this corporation nevertheless enjoy the benefits of
smaller-scale governance and improved supply-demand responsive261
ness.
One BID, which has helped to revolutionize a public space from a
place of dereliction and crime into a thriving, economically self254

See supra note 240.
Id.
256
See SETHA LOW ET AL., RETHINKING URBAN PARKS: PUBLIC SPACE AND CULTURAL
DIVERSITY 37–68 (2005) (identifying distinctive park use patterns among different
ethno-cultural groups in an earlier field study of Propsect Park, conducted in 1996–
97).
257
Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 503 (1997).
258
Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and
Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 368–69 (1999) [hereinafter Briffault, BIDs].
There are currently several hundred BIDs in the U.S., and dozens in New York City
alone. LAWRENCE O. HOUSTOUN, JR., BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 2–3, 150–51
(2d ed. 2003).
259
Id.
260
This is because the initial consent of the city is required for the BID’s establishment (in addition to that of the majority of property owners), and the city is also
represented on the BID’s board of directors and maintains supervision powers over
its activities. Briffault, BIDs, supra note 258, at 378, 439.
261
Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 77–
78 (1998).
255
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sustaining urban jewel, is the Bryant Park Restoration Corporation
262
(BPRC).
Bryant Park, located behind the New York Public Library
in the heart of Manhattan, fell into decay in 1960s due to city neglect,
and became a haven for drug dealers and muggers while keeping
263
away others. In the late 1970s, when the Rockefeller Brothers Fund
was seeking to contribute money to renovate the similarly declining
Public Library building, it made mitigating the Park’s problems a
264
condition for its support.
In 1980, BPRC was set up and started to
265
promote a renovation plan for the Park.
After twelve years of professional and public debate over the plan, and the capital expenditure of eighteen million dollars (two-thirds coming from the city, and
the rest from the private sector), the Park was renovated and soon
became a hub for daily leisure activities—about 5000 local office
workers using it to eat their lunch—as well as for events such as open266
air concerts and night movies.
The Park’s annual budget of about five million dollars is financed
chiefly by the levies imposed on the businesses located in the BID’s
area, concessions from the restaurant, café and kiosks in the Park,
267
and fees for special events.
The city donates more than $250,000
268
each year.
The ongoing success of the Park has fed the neighboring assets by dramatically driving up leasing activities and real estate
prices, making the BID a “win-win” setting for its private financiers
269
and its users.
While the use of the Park is regulated by BPRC, including restrictions on certain activities such as panhandling and dog
running, and limiting late-night closing hours, the Park is generally
270
kept open and inviting to the wide public.
5.

Publicly-Authorized, Conditional Commons:
Community Gardens

In many cases, the very establishment of a public space is not the
fruit of a pre-designated governmental act of land dedication, but the
result of dynamic, largely grassroots phenomena that are typical of
many cities. One prominent process is the de facto or de jure con262

See ALEXANDER GARVIN ET AL., URBAN PARKS AND OPEN SPACE 45–54 (1997).
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
See Pranay Gupte, Raising Private Funds To Remake a Public Park, N.Y. SUN, Jan.
26, 2006, at 15.
268
See GARVIN ET AL., supra note 262, at 50, 56–57.
269
Id. at 53–54.
270
Id. at 55.
263
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version of vacant or abandoned lands into community places.
In
these scenarios, the root causes for the long term vacancy or abandonment of properties often also point to the potential, and even the
necessity, of converting the land for such purposes or other beneficial
272
reuses.
The most prominent case of conversion of vacant or abandoned
lots into community spaces in the United States is that of New York
273
City’s community gardens.
These spaces started to evolve sponta274
neously in vacant or deserted city-owned lots in the mid 1970s,
mainly in some of the city’s toughest and most poor neighborhoods,
through the grassroots work of civic-minded and concerned individu275
als.
Over the years, more than 600 gardens evolved on city lots,
276
serving as models of community pride and ingenuity.
Following
their creation, the city established the Greenthumb program in 1978
277
to assist local gardeners with the care and security of the gardens.
278
Yet, during that period, the gardens had no formal status as such,
and their use was carried out through either short-term licenses or
279
without any formal permission.

271

See, e.g., Community Gardens are a Growing Trend, GLEBE & INNER CITY NEWS
(N.S.W.–Austl.), Mar. 29, 2000 (describing the proliferation of community gardens
in public properties in Sydney and other Australian cities); Schukoske, supra note
188, at 355 (depicting a similar phenomenon in Canada).
272
Two authors offer insight into the prevalence of vacant and abandoned properties stemming from macro trends such as de-industrialization and population shifts
to suburban communities alongside site-specific environmental, financial and legal
pitfalls. See ALAN MALLACH, BRINGING BUILDINGS BACK: FROM ABANDONED PROPERTIES
TO COMMUNITY ASSETS 3–8 (2006); Lavea Brachman, Vacant and Abandoned Property:
Remedies for Acquisition and Redevelopment, LAND LINES, Oct. 2005, at 1.
273
See, e.g., RUTH H. LANDMAN, CREATING COMMUNITY IN THE CITY: COOPERATIVES
AND COMMUNITY GARDENS IN WASHINGTON D.C. (1993); Kenneth Reich, Los Angeles
Community Garden Takes Root in South Los Angeles, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at B4.
274
The first space established was on a vacant lot at the corner of Bowery and
Houston Streets in Manhattan in 1973. See Mary K. Fons, The Green Guerillas, THE
COOPERATOR, Sep. 2003, available at http://cooperator.com/articles/914/1/TheGreen-Guerillas/Page1.html. The garden is currently named after its initiator, the
late artist Liz Christie. Id.
275
See Green Guerillas v. City of New York, as reported in N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 2002, at
28.
276
See generally MALVE VON HASSELL, THE STRUGGLE FOR EDEN: COMMUNITY GARDENS
IN NEW YORK CITY (2002) (giving a comprehensive study of community gardens in
Manhattan’s Lower East Side).
277
Id. at 48, 52.
278
The then-official maps showed vacant lots where community gardens were located. Id. at 18.
279
According to one report, in 1998, the City leased around 1,000 properties to
700 community groups. Schukoske, supra note 188, at 386.
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The tension between the de facto community use of the spaces
and their formal public ownership erupted in the mid-1990s, when
the city decided to auction hundreds of lots to developers for afford280
able housing projects. The first wave of auctions was avoided when
281
two non-profit organizations purchased 112 gardens in 1999.
Following a second wave of litigation over several hundred other lots,
282
which involved the Attorney General of the State of New York, a
283
deal was struck in 2002 between the City and the State.
According
to the agreement, beyond the ninety-three city-owned gardens that
were already under the jurisdiction of the Parks Department and
other non-development agencies and one hundred gardens that were
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education, 198 of the
city-owned sites that were under the jurisdiction of the Housing De284
partment were offered to the Parks Department.
Although the
agreement denies the gardens formal parkland status, the city has declared that it has no current development plans for these gardens
and that any future development plans would have to undergo review
procedures according to the New York State Environmental Quality
285
286
Review Act and the City’s land use review procedure.
Additionally, any proposed development plans would require the City to seek
287
an alternate site for the garden.
Although the conflict allegedly ended in community triumph, the
routine of the community gardens is laden with continuous obsta-

280

This decision was initially unsuccessfully challenged in courts by community
groups and the State of New York. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Coal. for the Pres. of Gardens v.
Giuliani, 670 N.Y.S.2d. 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 666 N.Y.S.2d 918 (App. Div.
1998).
281
The Trust for Public Land and the New York Restoration Project acquired 112
lots for a total of $4.2 million and placed the gardens in permanent land trusts. Dan
Barry, Sudden Deal Saves Gardens Set for Auction, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1999, at B1.
282
See State v. City of New York, 713 N.Y.S.2d 360 (App. Div. 2000) (granting a
temporary restraining order). Contrarily, community groups’ suits were dismissed
for lack of standing. N.Y.C. Coal. for the Pres. of Gardens, 666 N.Y.S.2d. at 918; Worley
v. Giuliani, 8 F. App’x. 131 (2d Cir. 2001); Green Guerillas, supra note 275, at 28.
283
Jennifer Steinhauer, Ending a Long Battle, New York Lets Housing and Gardens
Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 19, 2002, at A1.
284
Memorandum of Agreement between the State of New York and the City of
New York (Sept. 17, 2002) [hereinafter State-City Memorandum] (on file with author).
285
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 2002) (codified at
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.10–.20 (2000)).
286
N.Y. City Charter, ch. 8 § 197-c (2001).
287
State-City Memorandum, supra note 284, § 6(B). One hundred ten sites were
designated as “subject for development” following a streamlined garden review process, and twenty-eight as eligible for immediate development. Id. §§ 6(a), 7.

LEHAVI_FINAL

192

1/11/2008 1:59:14 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:137

288

cles.
Two of the agreement’s conditions for the prolongation of
the Greenthumb program and the protection of the gardens were the
continuation of fund allocation through either the federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program or other external
sources, and the formal registration and actual use of the various
289
gardens.
However, in view of the City’s continuous preparedness
for the possibility of federal defunding, and as some of the gardens
(around fourteen percent as of 2007) are no longer eligible for
CDBG funds because of a rise in the neighborhood’s socioeconomic
status, the City has started allocating funds for the gardens, but may
290
obviously become pressed for dollars should this trend intensify.
Yet, as more responsibilities are shouldered by the commonergardeners, their ability to maintain the garden increasingly depends
on their organizational, economic, and political capabilities. Somewhat ironically, even though the struggle for the preservation of the
gardens was carried out under the flag of “environmental justice,”
there is currently an abundance of prosperous gardens in Manhattan
and affluent areas in Brooklyn, and a lack thereof in impoverished
areas such as the South Bronx, into which councilmembers often pre291
fer to direct budgets to affordable housing for local constituents.
In sum, in the context of public spaces in New York City, the public-common spectrum can be roughly portrayed as including the following points:
Public

full-scale
public
maintenance &
mgmt.

Common

public maintenance &
mgmt. + informal user
groups

public maintenance & mgmt. +
incorporated
“friends of”
groups

public-common
City sub(non-profit)
structures (BIDs);
joint maintejoint maintenance & mgmt. nance & mgmt.
agreement

Chart 3
The Public-Common Continuum
(In New York City Public Spaces)

288
289
290
291

Interview with Edie Stone, Dir., Greenthumb (Sept. 15, 2004).
Id.
Interview with Linn & Johnston, supra note 209.
Interview with Stone, supra note 288.

publiclyauthorized,
conditional
commons
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C. The Bilateral Incentives Behind Public Commons
The evolution of the different types of “public commons” in governmentally-owned public spaces is a result of complex processes,
which are often resource-specific, that cannot be attributed to a single set of factors. Yet the gradual shift from traditional full-scale public provision, management, and financing to the various mixed models seems to reflect current forces, potentials, and constraints that
drive the chief stakeholders, mostly the cities on one hand, and, on
the other hand, the local groups of residents and businesses physically surrounding the public spaces.
The government’s modes of operation in publicly-owned resources, such as its public spaces, naturally combine normative policy
setting with practical budgetary constraints. In New York City, during
substantial periods since the 1970s, the City faced acute fiscal crises
that simply caused it to withdraw from many of its responsibilities in
public parks, leaving the parks to the fate of grassroots self-help ac292
tivities or other private initiatives.
When such patterns have existed, as portrayed above, public spaces have managed to thrive. In
the other less fortunate instances, City neglect has perpetuated and
293
exacerbated urban decline.
While throughout most of this era of
fiscal duress the City at least maintained the rhetoric of responsibility
for public spaces, the subsequent reign of Mayor Giuliani was often
294
characterized by idealization of overreaching privatization and even
295
by finger pointing at embittered residents.
Recent years have seen a shift in priorities and budget-setting for
parks, with the City acquiring almost 300 acres of new parkland since
2002 and substantially increasing both capital investments and oper292

See Tridib Banerjee, The Future of Public Spaces: Beyond Invented Streets and Reinvented Places, 67 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 9, 12 (2001).
293
Fred Siegel, Reclaiming our Public Spaces, in METROPOLIS: CENTER AND SYMBOL OF
OUR TIMES 369, 374 (Philip Kasinitz et al. eds., 1994). The City’s maintenance staff
was cut almost in half during the late 1970s and early 1990s. Id. Between 1994 and
2001, the Parks Department’s operating budget was cut by nearly thirty percent.
Joanne Wasserman, Parks Go to Seed for Lack of Green; Many Suffer from Fund Cuts, Neglect, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 4.
294
See E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION IN THE CITY: SUCCESSES, FAILURES, LESSONS 210–238
(2005) (describing privatization schemes in the Parks Department during this era,
including a short-term experiment with competitive outsourcing of park maintenance, and a more durable outsourcing program for maintenance of the Department’s fleet of vehicles and equipment).
295
Joanne Wasserman, Let Volunteers Fix Parks, Rudy Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug.
14, 2001, at 4. In one instance, Giuliani challenged New Yorkers to fix seedy city
park conditions themselves: “anyplace where a park isn’t what the community wants
it to be, they can volunteer to make it better. . . . I would use that as a challenge . . .
[that] we don’t have to rely on Big Brother to do everything.” Id.
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296

ating budgets for parks. Yet the City does not seem to be simply reverting to traditional public provision. Beyond the fact that mainte297
nance and renovation levels are still unsatisfactory at times, espe298
cially in several sites that the City has effectively given up on,
current public policy explicitly emphasizes the crucial role that residents and businesses should play in turning what otherwise “would
299
merely be open spaces” into “centerpieces of their communities.”
Accordingly, the myriad economic and organizational models combining private capital, community activity, or outsourced management aiming at attaining site-specific self sufficiency are heralded as
necessary ingredients in ensuring the success of government-owned
public spaces, especially with respect to long term maintenance
300
tasks.
From the viewpoint of local residents and businesses, successful
public spaces are instrumental in providing use benefits alongside
consequential benefits such as a rise in adjacent real estate prices and
301
a boost to economic and commercial activity. This type of stakeholding is especially dramatic given the potential adverse flip side of
neglected and derelict public spaces as harboring crime, disorder,
302
and economic and social decline.
These interests typically distinguish neighbors from residents located further away from the public
space, who usually use it less frequently because of travel costs or because of the availability of closer-by spaces, consequently being less

296

Timothy Williams, City Says Some Wretched Areas Aren’t Worth Fixing, N.Y. TIMES,
July 6, 2006, at B1 [hereinafter Williams, Wretched Areas].
297
Timothy Williams, Heralded as Parks, but Looking More Like Dumps, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2005, at A1.
298
Williams, Wretched Areas, supra note 296 (describing the dereliction of the
Bronx’s University Woods Park, and quoting Parks Commissioner Adrian Benepe
that investment in some spaces is “a waste of money . . . [j]ust because something is
in our inventory doesn’t mean it’s worth taking care of.”).
299
See CITY OF NEW YORK PARKS & RECREATION, BIENNIAL REPORT 2004–2005 13,
available at http://www.nycgovparks.org/download/biennialReport/parks_biennial_
report_2004-2005.pdf.
300
See OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, LIVING PLACES: CLEANER, SAFER,
GREENER (2003) (official report on the significant yet limited role that entities such
as public-private partnerships, local land trusts, and “friends of” should play in public
space stewardship in Britain).
301
See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text.
302
Studies have linked the state of a certain public space and the rate of crime
and disorder in and around it. See OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME
PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN DESIGN 11–12 (1972); Robert J. Sampson et al.,
Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCI. 918,
918–19 (1997).
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303

influenced by the public space, except in the relatively rare cases in
304
which the space has broader-scale non-use values.
The existence of such special interests may explain the emergence of grassroots forms of cooperation and coordination in governmentally owned resources, which are often able to overcome collective action problems even when the local group of users is
otherwise unorganized and has no preexisting formal contribution or
enforcement mechanisms. In many such cases, the initiators of the
group activity are moved to action by the prospects of private gain,
but at the same time may have relatively low discount rates and are
often able to employ informal monitoring techniques that ensure reciprocity and continuous effort by a sufficient amount of locals to
reach a critical level of sustainable cooperation. 305
D. Possible Tensions between “Public” and “Commons”
The common-public mixture can also be, however, a source of
friction when the interests of the local group of “commoners” are in
tension with those of the general public or other subgroups of it.
These conflicts may erupt during each one of the life-stages of the
public space: its establishment, its ongoing operation, and its possible
conversion or re-designation for a different public purpose.
The community gardens serve as an example for such a possible
tension during the establishment stage, or more exactly, in that specific instance, during the process of the formal validation and recognition of the informal vacant-lots-turned-into-public-spaces. Interestingly, as is the case in many impoverished areas in New York City, the
contest over the appropriate use of the publicly owned lands—
community gardens versus affordable housing—reflected not only a
local/general public debate, but also an internal conflict among locals
themselves.
The ongoing operation of the public spaces may also entail common/public frictions. City supervision may usually be sufficient to
ensure that mixed-managed parks such as Bryant Park or Prospect
Park would be generally inviting to the public at large, and would
even sufficiently tolerate to a certain extent the “undesirables,” such
as homeless people. However, more intimate public spaces, and es-

303

See, e.g., Been & Voicu, supra note 175, at 22 (showing that the positive impact
of community gardens on residential property values declines as the distance from
the garden grows).
304
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
305
See Lehavi, Property Rights, supra note 166, at 42–48 (offering a detailed analysis
of this phenomenon).
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pecially the community gardens in which the local groups are engaged in communal recreation and in individual plot gardening may
experience more frequent problems of exclusionary behavior by the
“commoners.” Thus, whereas Greenthumb requires community gardeners to keep the garden open to the general public “for a minimum of ten daylight hours per week between the months of May and
306
October,” the gardeners solely hold the keys to the garden’s gates
and employ numerous informal exclusionary practices aimed at ensuring that the garden remains firmly under the control of the local
307
group.
Common/public controversies may also arise when the governmental owner wishes to convert or re-designate the land for a new
purpose that will serve the general public or a different subgroup of
it, such as when a certain public space is located in the designated
path of a highway, or when the government wishes to build a certain
public building on the plot, or to sell the land to a private developer
308
and divert the sale revenues for other budgetary purposes.
While
such potential conflicts may be addressed in advance in cases involving formal mixed management or responsibility-sharing agreements
between the city and the sub-local group, in instances involving more
informal versions of public commons, the resolution of such conflicts
is made by either political power-plays or by the judicial application
of general doctrines that do not necessarily take into account the
uniquely mixed characteristics of the various types of public commons.
E. The Over- and Under-Inclusiveness of Current Law
The legal regime governing issues such as the dedication of lands
for public spaces, the permitted uses in these spaces, the relationship
between the interests of the abutting neighbors and those of the general public inside and outside the city, and the authority of the city to
convert the spaces for other purposes or to alienate the land is mostly
a result of state-based common law and legislative enactments. Although diverging between the different states, some principles seem
to be generally characteristic of the legal status of public spaces, and
particularly parks.

306

See Standard “Parks Greenthumb Garden License” Agreement § 8 (on file with
author).
307
See VON HASSELL, supra note 276, at 68–74 (describing such inter- and extragroup disputes about the gardens).
308
See Lehavi, Property Rights, supra note 166, at 3, 48–56 (elaborating on such potential conflicts).
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First, parkland is either created explicitly through overt provision,
such as restrictions set out in a deed of donation or in a specific legislative enactment, or implicitly such as through continuous use by the
city of the parcel for park purposes. There is, however, a difference
as to which purposes the park may be used based on the nature of the
original dedication. Thus, dedication of parkland by private donors
(“private dedication”) is construed strictly and generally cannot be
overridden even by express legislative authority to the municipality.
However, parkland that is created through purchase or condemnation of the land by the city and its dedication for park purposes
(“public dedication”) is subject to a more lenient approach when the
city later wishes to allow broader uses, such that a general legislative
authorization for municipalities to do so will usually suffice. 309
In a minority of states, New York being the most notable, the
courts have developed a public trust doctrine for public parks “to the
benefit of the people of the State,” which requires “the direct and
specific approval of the State legislature, plainly conferred” to use
310
publicly dedicated parks for any other purpose. Public dedications
in such states are thus endowed with an additional layer of legal pro311
tection, requiring the city to receive specific state authorization.
Second, outright alienation of land dedicated for park purposes
312
The procrequires direct legislative approval by the relevant state.
ess of state legislative authorization is often lengthy and cumbersome,
313
especially when the park has received state or federal funding. New
York State, for example, is generally more willing to allow alienation
314
when the city provides a substitute land for the transferred land.
Public re-designation or alienation procedures would usually be accompanied by state or city environmental or land use review proce315
dures.

309

See 64 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 1557 (2006).
See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1055
(N.Y. 2001) (forbidding the construction of a water treatment plant in the park, absent specific state authority).
311
See Michael Benn, Towards Environnmental Entrepeneurship: Restoring the Public
Trust Doctrine in New York, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 203 (2006) (critiquing the park/nonpark test in New York’s public trust doctrine and a calling for the application a more
flexible “public use” test).
312
See 10 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 28.38 (3d
ed. 2005).
313
See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF PARKS & RECREATION, HANDBOOK ON THE
ALIENATION AND CONVERSION OF MUNICIPAL PARKS 13–14, 21–22 (rev’d ed. 2005).
314
Id. at 21.
315
See Benn, supra note 311, at 217–25 (discussing such requirements in New York
State).
310
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Third, courts are generally reluctant to recognize the special interests of adjacent residents and businesses in the public space in
316
cases of conflict. In Reichelderfer v. Quinn, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that although the neighboring owners that filed
the suit had enjoyed special benefits by the presence of the Rock
Creek Park, such increase in value did not create interests constitutionally protected against diminution in value by the government,
even when their properties had been previously assessed for these
317
benefits.
More broadly, state courts have emphasized that the
beneficiary of the public space is the entire general public of the government, such that the subgroup of adjacent residents is not entitled
to special privileges in the public space, let alone to any power of veto
318
over the public park’s conversion or alienation.
Current law, which has been shaped against the background of
traditional governmental provision and maintenance of public
spaces, seems to be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive in dealing
with the preservation of public spaces or the regulation of their use.
On the one hand, it sets out procedural and institutional barriers to
deviation from the public space’s original designation. On the other
hand, it fails to recognize the evolving reality in which the special affinity of neighbors, alongside more general processes of outsourcing
and privatization in cities, fundamentally changes the manner in
which many public spaces are regularly maintained and operated.
Even if the legal regime were to knowingly advocate the use of steady
rules over open-ended, resource-specific standards, it would still need
to be reconsidered in order to more appropriately manage the public
commons.
F.

Providing Mixed Solutions for Public Commons

As is the case with public-private and private-common property
regimes, the growth of mixed public-common regimes requires that
the law be readjusted in appropriate cases to create the correct incentives for the protagonists and to properly balance between the “public” and “common” elements. In principle, this revision should apply
to the different life stages of public spaces or other resources that are
systematically shifting in the direction of mixed property. A full scale
development of such a legal regime is outside the scope of this Article.

316
317
318

287 U.S. 315 (1932).
Id. at 323.
64 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 1557 (2006).
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One suggestion that I make with respect to otherwise locally uncompensated conversions or alienations of pre-designated public
spaces, and which is especially relevant to persistent yet informal
models of group stewardship of public resources, is to create a substantive group remedy in favor of the local group of users according
to the following principles: First, the remedy would be collective and
non-pecuniary, focusing primarily on the provision of a nearby substitute facility. Second, the remedy would be based on a liability rule
principle, meaning that the group would not be entitled to block the
public plan until the remedy is assured. Third, such a remedy would
be awarded only if the affected local group is able to demonstrate the
long lasting patterns of significant group stewardship as well as the
occurrence of a substantial loss. Fourth, the costs of providing the
remedy would exceed neither the aggregate social costs of the loss of
319
the public space nor the new project’s estimated surplus.
V. TRI-LAYERED PROPERTY REGIMES
Some of the dual property regimes portrayed in the previous
parts, as well as many other property configurations, involve in fact a
tri-layered regime. For example, CICs, which have been depicted as
representing a private-common regime, are complemented by significant public regulation that is typical of similar land uses and are
naturally subject to other forms of public intervention including
property taxation. Indeed, many property regimes in various contexts
can be viewed as combining private, common, and public traits.
There are, however, several property configurations which are of
special interest in the sense that they explicitly seek to balance private, common, and public interests as having more or less equal
weight, so that they can be seen as genuine trilateral or tri-layered
property regimes. A primary example is “third sector housing,”
which has been developed in the past few decades as an alternative
housing strategy, which seeks to expand homeownership among
lower-income households but at the same time to mitigate the increased risks that have brought a high number of such households to
mortgage foreclosures and loss of their homes. 320 An interim model

319

See Lehavi, Property Rights, supra note 166, at 85–97 (providing a full elaboration
of this suggested remedy).
320
JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE CHANGING
LANDSCAPE OF RESALE RESTRICTED, OWNER OCCUPIED HOUSING 1 (2006), http://www
.nhi.org/pdf/SharedEquityHome.pdf.
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that aims at achieving these goals through a normatively oriented
321
mixed property regime is that of “shared equity housing.”
This basic model, which has been implemented in a number of
different versions in the U.S., generally conforms to the following
principles: (1) the people who occupy the housing units are homeowners, not tenants; (2) the equity stemming from the property value
is shared between the homeowner and the community, meaning that
while the homeowner keeps the value of his investments over time on
resale, the rise in value stemming largely from community investment
both at the initial stage and at later periods remains mostly within the
community; and (3) beyond resale revenue allocation, the individual
and the community share many other burdens and benefits throughout the different life stages of the housing project. 322
One particularly intriguing version, briefly noted here, is that of
Community Land Trusts (CLTs), currently numbering nearly two
323
hundred throughout the U.S.
CLTs, which are community-based
non-profit organizations that started to form in the 1970s mainly
through the initiative of local activists, have been receiving growing
financial and administrative support from municipal and state officials, and as of 1992 also from the federal government, when CLTs
became eligible for HOME funding and other forms of HUD assis324
tance.
Moreover, in 2001, Fannie Mae, the largest U.S. organization working with lenders to provide affordable loans for families of
low and moderate income, approved a Uniform Community Land
Trust Rider, which readily facilitates the establishment and expansion
325
of CLTs, although most CLTs in the various cities still include no
326
more than a few dozen housing units.
The basic idea behind the CLT is that a community-based nonprofit acquires the land for the purpose of retaining ownership in it
321

Id.
Id. at 2–4.
323
According to a recent survey, there were 186 CLTs in the U.S. See Rosalind
Greenstein & Yesim Sungu-Eryilmaz, A National Study of Community Land Trusts (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working Paper WP07YS1, 2007), at 4. Other prominent versions of shared equity housing are Deed-Restricted Homes and Limited Equity Cooperatives. DAVIS, supra note 320, at 13–18, 23–31.
324
Id. at 21.
325
Id. at 19–22.
326
Id. at 22. In the past few years, however, local governments have been playing
an increasingly dominant role in the creation and financing of CLTs because they
view the CLT mechanism as preferable to other forms of governmental activity for
ensuring the goals of permanent housing affordability and subsidy retention. This
may affect the number of housing units in new CLTs. The City of Irvine, California
announced in May 2006 its commitment to fund the creation of nearly 10,000 CLT
units within a decade. Greenstein & Sungu-Eryilmaz, supra note 323, at 4.
322
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forever for affordable housing purposes. The individual homeowner
leases the land for a long period of time (typically ninety-nine years),
327
and is the owner of the building that is erected on the land.
The
lease agreement on the land divides the property bundle between the
individual and the CLT both during the tenancy and upon its trans328
fer by inheritance or resale.
Thus, for example, the homeowner
must occupy the land as his primary residence and may not sublease
329
the land without the CLT’s consent. He is required to receive CLT
permission for major capital improvements and is obligated to prop330
erly maintain the building. If the homeowner fails to pay the mort331
gage, his interests may be taken over by the CLT.
To keep the land available for affordable housing in perpetuity,
even in neighborhoods that enjoy rising values, when the homeowner
decides to sell, the CLT repurchases the property itself or monitors
and approves the property’s direct transfer from seller to buyer. In
any case, the resale price is restricted to a formula, which aims at giving the departing homeowner a fair return on his investment, while
at the same time giving future income-eligible homebuyers a fair and
affordable access to this housing, and so forth for generations to
332
come.
Another intriguing facet of this tri-layered property regime concerns the CLT’s board structure. The CLT is an open-membership
organization for all those that live within the wider geographic area
333
which the CLT defines as the “community.”
One-third of the CLT
board is comprised of representatives of the leasehold334
ers/homeowners.
Another third is elected to represent the interests of other community residents outside the CLT affordable hous335
ing units.
The final third is elected by the two-thirds who have
already been elected, with seats often reserved for the local govern327

This is the case for a project involving detached housing. When the building is
a multi-unit condominium or cooperative, the building’s owner may be a CIC or a
different non-profit corporation, with individuals owning the different housing units.
DAVIS, supra note 320, at 18.
328
Id. at 20.
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
Id. at 20–21.
332
Greenstein & Sungu-Eryilmaz, supra note 323, at 29–33.
333
Whereas in the past the definition of “community” was limited to the boundaries of a single neighborhood, many current CLTs delineate the community’s borders more broadly to include multiple neighborhoods, an entire city, or even a whole
metropolitan area. DAVIS, supra note 320, at 20.
334
Id.
335
Id.
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ment’s representatives, private lenders, or other community-based
336
organizations.
This tri-layered structure is intended to mediate between the interests of the leaseholders/homeowners as individuals,
their interests as a group, and the interests of other stakeholders in
the broader “community.” Thus, the private, common, and public
elements are fascinatingly intertwined in the CLT to implement the
constitutive normative goal of sharing entitlements and responsibilities in a mixed-income household community, which is driven by a
mixed ideological and social vision.
VI. TOWARD A UNIFYING THEORY OF MIXED PROPERTY REGIMES
Though the different regimes portrayed in the previous parts diverge in many respects, I suggest that the systematic growth and expansion of hybrid forms of property regimes can be generally analyzed on a consolidated basis, which would lay out the descriptive and
normative underpinnings of mixed regimes with the purpose of delineating a unifying theory for these property configurations.
A. Mixed Optimal Scales and Production Functions
In his seminal work on property in land, Robert Ellickson identifies the problem of efficient boundaries as implicating the proper
337
choice of a property regime. Illustrating activities in land as falling
into the categories of small, medium, and large events, Ellickson suggests that while the regulation of small events conforms to the Demsetzian model of private property parcelization, other simultaneous
uses and activities that have a broader effect may necessitate complementary external institutions such as norms of neighborliness,
338
common-law nuisance rules, and government land-use rules. When
a significant portion of the uses and activities are large in scale, especially when they are rationally supported by the potential advantages
of economies of scale and risk-spreading, efficiency may require the
construction of common property regimes containing internal bind339
ing institutions for cooperation and coordination.
Later literature, which has built up on Ellickson’s insight about
the complexity embedded in the simultaneousness of various activities and uses, has conceptually divided property regimes as comprising of distinct, though related, realms of rights allocation and of gov-

336
337
338
339

Id.
Ellickson, supra note 25, at 1332–35.
Id. at 1327–34.
Id. at 1334–35.

LEHAVI_FINAL

2008]

1/11/2008 1:59:14 PM

MIXING PROPERTY

203

340

ernance. This approach realized the necessity of occasionally separating between the two realms so that certain bundles of the property
sticks relating to specifically important activities and uses that defy
formal boundaries would be regulated by substantial group or public
governance, although such complexity creates high startup costs for
341
the property system.
While this framework may still be considered as keeping intact a
revised yet coherent division between private, common, and public
property, market forces and corresponding legal rules have been
continuously challenging and shifting these boundaries. As Lee
Anne Fennell notes in the context of residential properties in metropolitan areas, there is growing recognition that the value of properties is often determined not only by the onsite attributes, but moreover by people, things, services, and conditions lying beyond what we
342
traditionally refer to as the property’s boundaries. Beyond physical
externalities which have been long explicitly considered and addressed in the law, the growing prevalence of preferred spatial associations comprising of the “right” neighbors which provide and en343
sure the maintenance of the “correct” neighborhood ambience, has
been a major force behind the creation and legal validation of new
property institutions such as CICs that create an explicit mix both in
the rights allocation and in the governance structure. In this and
other contexts, collective action problems are addressed by the creation of new types of regimes located in interim points along the sides
of the private-common-property triangle and inside it. More broadly,
the proliferation of legal phenomena such as CICs, although often
socially contestable, demonstrates the institutional potential in extending the choices of property regimes so as to attain certain values
and goals in light of changing realities or shifting normative conceptions.
Yet there is obviously more to efficiency-based property arrangements than the issue of boundaries and externalities. As Demsetz
himself addressed in his own sequel, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights

340

See Heller, Common, supra note 3, at 330–32; see also Carol M. Rose, Left Brain,
Right Brain and History in the New Law and Economics of Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 479,
479–84 (2000) (offering a slightly different, yet basically similar division).
341
Smith, Two Strategies, supra note 3, at 470, 474–79.
342
Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian Perspective, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF
WILLIAM OATES 163, 164–68 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006).
343
Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1228
(2006).
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344

II,” the decision about the preferred mechanisms for control of resources involves a host of other issues such as the ability to obtain certain societal goals through the work of markets, the incentive structure for productivity in different institutions, the nature of the
personal relations between members in a given community, and the
345
complexity level of different organizations.
Whereas Demsetz still
believes that these parameters point toward the private vertex, lessons
learned in the U.S. and throughout the world—as presented in this
346
Article, for example in the Public-Private Partnerships context —
demonstrate that the correct answer is often to be found at the interim point, and that any property equilibrium may be challenged by
the occurrence of endogenous and exogenous changes that Demsetz
himself had identified in his original work as necessitating a shift in
347
property regimes.
While my analysis of mixed property is by no means antagonistic
to the “bundle of rights” analytic concept of property or to the exclusion/governance literature, and rather may be seen as an extension
of them, it is distinctive in that it points to (1) the proliferation of systematic social institutions embracing an explicit mixture in both the
rights allocation and the property governance axes; (2) the dissonance between this growing phenomenon and the current doctrinal
framework that is still much influenced by the public/private dichotomy (or actually a trichotomy); (3) the potential normative advantages of explicit mixed institutions, past and present, over the more
conventional paradigms of property
B. Mixed Non-Utilitarian Values
To say that property is not only about efficiency or utility is an
axiom (not to say a cliché). As briefly mentioned in Part I, proponents of “pure” private property rights have advocated them also in
the name of liberty, autonomy, political freedom, etc. Similarly, the
creation of publicly-owned resources has not been restricted to public
348
goods (in the narrow economic sense), but was, and is, also a tool
to attain societal goals such as vertical equity, social integration, or
preservation of human dignity. Ideologies and moral visions of the
world have been playing, and will continue to play, a key role in the
way we shape property regimes.
344
345
346
347
348

Demsetz, Theory II, supra note 15.
Id. at 657–65.
See supra Part II.A.
Demsetz, Theory I, supra note 7, at 350.
See supra note 38 and accompanying notes.
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What seems to typify many of the mixed property regimes is that
they are based on explicitly-mixed ideologies, combining, or more
exactly compromising, desires for individualism and economic
maximization with notions of equity and solidarity. The Renewing
Kibbutz explicitly defines itself as located midway between individualism and collectivism, and has correspondingly created a mixed property regime. New York City currently advocates ideas of economic efficiency and self-sustainability alongside its basic commitment to
publicness, openness, and democracy in the way it manages its public
spaces. CLTs mediate between the desire of the homeowner to enjoy
a value gain on the property upon resale and their commitment to
the community and to future homeowners who wish to enjoy the
same access to affordable housing that the seller had initially enjoyed.
Sometimes, the implementation of such a mixed ideology ends up in
resounding failure. 349 In such instances, the circle (or actually, the
triangle) simply cannot be squared. This does not mean, however,
that conscious societal decisions to follow a middle ideological or
moral pattern cannot be successfully translated, in appropriate cases,
to hybrid property regimes.
Mixed ideologies may not always necessitate the creation of explicitly mixed property regimes. For example, a growing number of
authors have challenged private property from within, arguing that
private property itself is or should be laden with principles of social
350
responsibility and distributive justice, and calling to reexamine spe351
cific exclusionary or self-promoting bundles in the property stick.
I do not argue that private property should be libertarian in nature, and there may be a host of good reasons to limit exclusionary
property rights in the name of public or community interests, or otherwise to craft private property regimes with the purpose of attaining
goals such as equity. An interesting example is the evolution of private property rights in water in the Western United States. The Colo349

See NATALIE MEHRA, FLAWED, FAILED, ABANDONED: 100 P3S—CANADIAN &
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 1 (2005), http://www.healthcoalition.ca/ffaf.pdf (reporting alleged Public-Private Partnerships failures, which at times made necessary full republicization of resources); see also infra Part VI.C.
350
See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPERTY 20–21 (2006); David Lametti, The (Virtue) Ethics of Private Property: A Framework and Implications, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, OBLIGATIONS AND
RESTITUTION 39, 44–56 (A. Hudson ed., 2003); Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 767–78 (1999).
351
Lior Strahilevitz has critiqued the two traditional pillars of private ownership:
the right to destroy and the right to exclude. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information
Asymmetries and the Right to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (2006); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005).

LEHAVI_FINAL

206

1/11/2008 1:59:14 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:137

rado Constitution, along with subsequent legislation, regulation, and
case law, created a unique “prior appropriation” system designed to
combat monopolization and speculation by riparian or upstream
owners, by giving a broader group of stakeholders the chance to ap352
propriate water required for their “beneficial use.” Private rights in
water were thus designed with an egalitarian ideology in mind (although one can actually argue that certain features of the regime,
such as substantial limits on trade, effectively created a mixed regime).
However, such approaches to private property, as they are void of
any inherent normative content, have their limits. Designing a private property regime means that individuals are allocated formal
rights as well as broad decisionmaking powers with respect to resources. Whereas the initial allocation of rights may change based on
a certain normative viewpoint (as the example of water rights indicates), and some limits may be placed on the boundaries of such
rights on an ongoing basis while still considering the regime to be
“private,” the very decision to place prominent powers in the hands
of individuals does have a certain meaning and does bear some foreseeable consequences that cannot simply be dismissed as nonexistent.
Not always can certain goals and values be attained through a private
property regime for a certain resource, just as the case may be for
public or common property regimes.
And this is exactly where institutionalized property mixtures
come into play. When the results emanating from a certain property
regime are deemed unsatisfactory, society’s collective decisionmaking
bodies may very well change the property regime, including a switch to
a uniquely-crafted property mixture. Thus, it seems that those advocating certain values such as social responsibility or distributive justice
should focus their attention on suggesting a systematic property regime that is most suitable for these purposes rather than simply viewing private property as a useless, freely-manipulated legal concept.
C. Flexibility in Trial-and-Error
A change in a property regime regulating a certain resource may
often be a daunting task. Beyond the inherent transition costs that
353
typify any sort of legal change, socially desirable changes in property regimes may often be delayed or blocked altogether by politically
powerful actors who are anxious mainly about the distributive out352

David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of
Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3, 41–56 (2005).
353
See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 816–
40 (2002).
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comes of the proposed change in the legal status-quo.
At least in
some instances, a switch from a certain “pure” property regime to a
mixed regime that combines substantial elements from the previous
regime, rather than a wholesale switch to another pure property regime, may prove to be more feasible by mitigating the level of resistance, at least to some degree.
When the mixed property regime is considered optimal regardless of the issue of possible opposition, then such a regime may enjoy
the best of both worlds. This is very much the case with the Renewing
Kibbutz. The Renewing Kibbutz was designed based on a model
which sought to combine partial privatization and rewards for individual productivity alongside the assurance of a redistributive “safety
net” for disadvantaged members and the preservation of substantial
group control over life in the Renewing Kibbutz. This interim ideological approach also proved instrumental in alleviating the resistance of members who had good reasons to fear the change, especially the elderly generations who had founded the cooperative
Kibbutz or lived in it their entire productive adult lives, and thus had
no private savings. 355 In other instances, the choice of a mixture may
be a conscious compromise, for example, when a deregulatory switch
to a market regime is constrained by a “grandfathering” of rights to
356
current stakeholders that threaten to veto the change.
This relative advantage of mixed property regimes may also be
manifested when such a regime yields unsatisfactory results, and the
policymaker wishes to redesign the regime by either amending it or,
in some cases, by reverting back to the original “purer” regime. In
such instances, the mixed nature of the property regime may make it
easier to correct errors that are revealed following the trial.
The British railway system is a case in point. This industry, which
had been nationalized during the 1940s but had been suffering
chronic budgetary and infrastructure problems causing a sharp decrease in demand by consumers, underwent a swift process of privatization during the early 1990s under which track maintenance and
operation were outsourced and train services to passengers were
franchised to private firms, while both functions still remained heavily financed by the public. Within a few years, it became obvious that
354

See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
See Vered Levi-Barzilay, At the Top of the Food Chain, HAARETZ.COM (Eng. ed.),
July 2, 2004.
356
See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275,
290–96 (2000) (arguing that switches to regimes of tradable pollution rights in the
U.S. took place only when the initial permits were not auctioned, but grandfathered,
to existing, politically powerful polluters).
355

LEHAVI_FINAL

208

1/11/2008 1:59:14 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:137

this model of privatization was failing miserably: maintenance levels
were poor, as tragically revealed by a deadly accident in Hatfield in
2000; franchised train companies were unable to respond to changing needs especially because of the rigid structure of the franchise
agreements; the firms that were supplying and leasing trains and carriages to the operating companies were blamed with over-charging;
and the multitude of governmental entities charged with financing
and regulating the industry, with unclear division of responsibilities
between them, further added to market distortions and to a major
waste of public funds. 357
Following these failures, the British government has taken several
steps. It terminated the outsourcing railway maintenance agreements
for compensation and currently provides these services in-house by
Network Rail, a non-profit body financed by public funds and regu358
lated by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR).
ORR has also recently threatened to start an antitrust inquiry against the train-leasing
companies unless they agreed to cut the prices charged from the
359
publicly-subsidized train operators.
More broadly, the government
has designed a new scheme whereby it will take charge of the railway
strategy by setting the level of public expenditure and making decisions on what should be purchased, and ensuring that other governmental agencies will be given clearer mandates and will work closely
360
with private firms to provide a renewed scheme of collaboration.
These changes were made possible, both legally and politically,
largely because of the fact that even under the privatization scheme,
the formal property regime governing British railways was mixed and
maintained sufficient public powers (alongside substantial public
funding) over the industry to allow for such changes when the model
proved to be flawed. Although in theory the government could have
always re-publicized fully privatized resources by using its taking
power, there is no doubt that this latter measure would have proven
much more burdensome and costly, both financially and politically.
Evidence from other countries about such reorganizations, occasionally taking even the form of wholesale re-publicization, similarly
357

See HER MAJESTY’S DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, THE FUTURE OF RAIL—
WHITE PAPER 10–18 (2004) [hereinafter H.M.T.,THE FUTURE OF RAIL].
358
For example, one firm, Carillion, was paid £17.6 million for contract termination and transfer of its assets to Network Rail, in a move aimed at saving £100 million
of public funds annually. Andrew Clark, Carillion Receives £17m Rail Payoff, THE
GUARDIAN, June 2, 2004, at 18.
359
See David Teather, Train-leasing Banks Face Inquiry amid Claims that Public is Being
Ripped Off, THE GUARDIAN, June 29, 2006, at 27.
360
H.M.T.,THE FUTURE OF RAIL, supra note 357, at 6–8, 41–52.
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reveals the potential flexibility embedded in mixed regimes in mat361
ters facing constant changes in market or public conditions. While
there may be cases, for example in the Public-Private Partnerships
context, in which the government would neglect to take advantage of
this better potential for change due to apathy, political capture by
current private stakeholders, or loss of institutional knowledge that
practically prevents the government from regaining public control,
the formal structure of such partnerships is a significant tool that may
facilitate required changes in the property equilibrium.
D. Integrity of Legal Categories
The distinction between private law and public law continues to
constitute a great challenge and is a source of constant debate in legal scholarship. The rival opinions as to whether an authentic line
can be drawn between the two realms—in the sense that each realm
maintains a distinct, coherent integrity of underlying principles that
does not collapse into mere tautology or into indistinguishable assimilation and diffusion between the two realms—will probably continue to clash in the future, and this Article will not even attempt to
fully resolve the matter. 362
The debate over such line drawing is not of course “the sole and
363
despotic dominion” of law. The public/private distinction is con364
sidered one of the “great dichotomies” of Western thought, and is
central to many fields in the humanities and the social sciences. As
Jeff Weintraub notes, the inherent difficulty in addressing this issue
stems largely from the abundance of definitions and types of organizing categories and the lack of a unifying theory, or at least of a con365
scious dialogue between these different worlds of discourse.
Thus,
361

See, e.g., Natalie Alcoba, City Eyes Takeover of Water, Sewer Operations, THE
HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Ontario, Can.), Aug. 31, 2004, at A1 (reporting the republicization of water and watershed facilities in the City of Hamilton); Adrian
Rollins, La Trobe Hospital Return to Public Control, THE AGE (Melbourne, Austl.), Oct.
24, 2000, at 4 (reporting the early termination of a twenty-year contract for the private operation of a regional hospital in the Australian State of Victoria).
362
See N.E. Simmonds, Justice, Causation and Private Law, in PUBLIC & PRIVATE:
LEGAL, POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 149 (Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves
& Ursula Vogel eds., 2000) (analyzing the debate over the integrity of such a distinction).
363
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (facsimile
ed. 1979) (1766).
364
NORBERTO BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF
STATE POWER 1–3 (Peter Kennealy trans., 1989).
365
Jeff Weintraub, The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction, in PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 1, 2–4 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds.,
1997).
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in the classic liberal tradition, the distinction is largely drawn between
the administrative state representing the public sector and the mar366
ket reflecting the private sector.
A different type of taxonomy, ad367
368
vanced by writers such as Hanna Arendt and Jürgen Habermas,
designates the “public sphere” as the realm of political community, in
which members actively participate in collective decisionmaking, as
opposed to matters that are chiefly of private concern. Here, the different arenas may depart from the liberal distinctions. Just as the
“public realm” can exist outside the state (such as in voluntary organizations), an administrative state which lacks active participation
369
cannot be regarded as genuinely “public.”
Yet another type of public/private discourse, largely the province
of social theory, touches upon the tension between privacy/intimacy
and social interaction. Whereas some writers such as Erving Goffman
370
have stressed the importance of separation, others such as Jane Jacobs have seen outside-the-state, unmediated interaction between
persons, even if apolitical in nature, as a major positive force of a vi371
brant human society. The recognition of such different, co-existent
forms of sociability has prompted calls for departing from the public/private dichotomy. Sociologist Alan Wolfe has called, for example, to define a new realm of publics, distinct from private and public,
which would be comprised of families and kinship networks, associations, ethnic and racial groups, and other types of sub-society com372
munities.
While such a sociological trichotomic delineation may
translate conveniently to the property private-common-public division, the law has broader lessons to learn from the constant efforts in
other fields to define and redefine the borders between the different
spheres of life, recognizing the essentiality of line-drawing but at the
same time understanding that these distinctions are uncertain,
changeable, and often misleading.

366
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368
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1989) (1962).
369
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HABERMAS, supra note 368, at 160–61.
370
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371
JANE JACOBS, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 71–73 (1961).
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Alan Wolfe, Public and Private in Theory and Practice: Some Implications of an Uncertain Boundary, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 182, 196–201 (Jeff
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For property law, which sets out the ways in which we handle resources and the human relationships around them, this means that
property regimes may be placed in various points along the sides of
the property triangle and within it, and that such placements are
meaningful in the sense that they should implicate the legal rules
that govern the property regime. Property mixtures, namely those
configurations that are located at a relative distance from the triangle’s vertices, can be the subject of distinctive legal regimes that
properly meet the societal needs at the basis of the mixed regime
while at the same time ensuring a sufficient level of stability and certainty that is paramount for a legal system as a whole. The borders
between private, common, and public property can be crossed at
times without nullifying the underlying importance of such basic divisions. As demonstrated by the different mixed property regimes portrayed in this Article, legal regimes may be built and particular issues
can be addressed by combining long lasting traditions with legal innovation to create a tailor-made, socially desirable mixed form of resource allocation and management.
CONCLUSION
Pure property regimes are useful classifications and points of departure, but in today’s complex and dynamic world, more than ever
before, they do not represent a considerable portion of the ways in
which property rights are structured, allocated, and enforced. As
Carol Rose has demonstrated, even William Blackstone’s famous depiction of private property as endowing absolute rights was more
wishful thinking than a depiction of the doctrinal reality of his time—
an anxiety-relieving rhetoric of clarity uttered against a complex
373
background of overlapping interests and mixed societal values.
At the same time, however, the fact that the current landscape of
property regimes is richer, and consists of various configurations that
are located along endpoints and interim points on and within the
property triangle, is far from viewing property as an inherently empty
374
concept that can be freely manipulated, or which simply collapses
into an ad hoc expression of societal values or other types of prefer375
ences in the resolution of a specific scenario.
373

Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601,
603–06 (1998).
374
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 364–66, 385–94 (offering a critical review
of this line of thought, which is allegedly supported by the post-Hohfeld realist writing, as well as by more contemporary schools such as the economic analysis of law).
375
See Simmonds, supra note 362, at 164–69 (critiquing this position in the more
general context of private law rights).
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Richness does not mean nihilism. The construction of various
property configurations, each with its unique bundle of entitlements
and responsibilities, can be made in a way that both better meets the
changing needs of society and provides the platform for the possibility of future change, and at the same time maintains a sufficient level
of coherence and certainty that validates property law as a meaningful mechanism that stands firmly on its own feet. As this Article has
demonstrated, the reality of successful mixed property regimes,
alongside the need to legally amend or update other such regimes so
as to enable them to more appropriately achieve the normative goals
that stand at the basis of their establishment, point both to the continuing integrity of property law and to its potential to address future
promises and challenges.

